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The Speciticity of Skill Acquisition: Is it Task Related'!
Abstract
The plethora of research into the area of skill acquisition and transfer has resulted in
con!licting conclusions regarding the nature of transfer. Some researchers have found
skill transfer to be specific to the items experienced during training (Logan, I988,
alphabet-arithmetic task; Masson, 1986, reverse reading task). Others have found
transfer to be general (Speelman & Kirsner, I 997, syllogism task) or both general and
specific in the same task (Greig & Speelman, 1999, algebra task). This study
investigated the assumption that the task involved dictates the specific nature of skill
acquisition and transfer. Sixty participants drawn from the Edith Cowan School of
Psychology volunteer register were randomly assigned to four groups, with each group
performing one of the afore mentioned tasks. In phase I, learning was detennined by
the decreased Reaction Time (RT) for each participant from block I to block 8. Phase 2
involved participants being trained on a different task using one set of items and then in
the transfer phase (3) participants perfonned the same task but with new items.
Compa6ng RT data from block I phase 2 and block I phase 3 and from block I phase 3
to block I 0 phase 2 assessed transfer. The syllogism task resulted in the most skill
transfer due to the generalisability of the strategy employed in solving the syllogisms.
This was followed by the algebra task, the alphabet-arithmetic task, and the reversed
reading task. The results confirmed the a priori predictions that the nature of transfer is
a function of the task involved.
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Supervisor: Dr Craig Speelman
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The Specificity of Skill Acquisition: Is it Task Related'?

Given the relevance of'lcarning and skill acquisition to all domains of' human
endeavour it is hardly surprising that the topic has resulted in a rlcthora of literature.
From birth. humans arc lc<trning new skills and achieving milestones in their ability
to ncgotmtc their world. Consequently, researchers arc equally avid in striving to
understand the cognitive processes that enable skill acquisition, be it learning to read,
ride a bike, or fly the space shuttle.

Defining what is meant by the tenn 'skill' has occupied researchers from a variety of
domains fer several decades (Adams, 1987). One of the earliest definitions of the
tenn came from a British psychologist T. H. Pear (1927), and his interpretation of
what defined 'skill' continues to influence current thinking. Pear's definition held that
skill was the ". .integration ofwell-adjl''>ted performances, .... skill is acquired and
fused with natural aptitude" (pp. 480-481). This definition implies the need for both
capacity and ability. But skill acquisition is distinguished from both in that one might
have the capacity and ability to perfom1 a task yet be unable to do so because the
skill has not been learnt (Adams, 1987).

The importance of understanding the mechanisms underpinning skill acquisition, and
arguably more importantly, the transfer of skills to new domains, has never been
greater than it is now at the end of the 20'h century (for reviews, see Adams, 1987;
Masson, 1990; Singley & Anderson, 1989). With the current emphasis on achieving
a reliable and competent, multi-skilled workforce the relevance of research in this
area has increased. Unfortunately several questions pertinent to this issue remain
unresolved. For example, can workers trained in one domain be effectively
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redeployed to another task without the need for expensive retraining? h1rthennore,
arc there ccrt<.lin 'generic' skills that cun he.: transferred hctween roles that would
reduce those retraining costs'!

Answers to these questions differ depending on the theoretical perspective of the
respondent. A number of theories about the way skills arc acquired and generalised
beyond the training context have been proposed (Anderson 1983, 1993; Logan, 1988;
MacKay, 1982; Newell & Rosenbloom, 1988; Rickard, 1997). Each has been
developed using a variety of tasks in a range of training situations but researchers
have yet to gain consensus.

In reviewing the evidence in support of the major theories, this paper attempts to
establish the argument that the specificity of skill transfer is a function the task itself
rather than a result of cognitive processes involved in perfonning a task per se. The
review begins by offering a brief overview of the mechanisms involved in skill
acquisition. Of particular importance is the role played by memory and immediate
feedback. This will be followed by a discussion of Logan's instance theory and
Anderson's ACT* theory and the specific tasks involved in generating the transfer
literature.

Skill Acquisition
The importance of immediate feedback in tenns of its role in skill acquisition has its
roots with Thorndike, who, based on his Law of Effect, stated that knowledge of
results, or reinforcement, automatically emphasised the connection between the
situation and response without conscious processing (Adams, 1987). Thorndike
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viewed feedback in terms of a habit-based or behavioural response similar to the
stimulus-response mechanism of operant conditioning. The opposing view saw the
benefits of feedback as informational or cognitive, based on awareness, planning,
reasoning and decision making (Adams, 1987).

The latter framework presents feedback as a component in a loop whereby the person
remembers the situation and the given response and combines it with the feedback
results. On subsequent trials the person recalls the situation, the response and the
feedback given and makes a decision that eliminates any error embodied in the
previous response (Anderson. 1987). This argument is a key concept in Anderson's
ACT* theory of skill acquisition, which will be discussed in detail later, in that
successful application of production rules results in strengthening of the association
between the stimulus and the response, leading to faster reaction times. Intuitively
this argument makes sense. For instance, dancers train in front of large mirrors in
order to correct their posture and technique and gymnasts videotape their routines to
refine and improve the fluidity and grace of the perfonnance.

Empirical research has also supported the need for immediate feedback as a factor in
improving performance and the acquisition of skill. For example, Lewis and
Anderson (1985) perfonned an experiment involving a 'Dungeons and Dragons'
board game. Participants were divided into two conditions, one received immediate
feedback on perfonnance and the other received no feedback. The game involved
participants proceeding though the various rooms portrayed in the game. Often these
rooms would be a dead-end and players had to retrace their path to move fotward.
Lewis and Anderson (1985) found that participants who received immediate
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feedback pertaining to their error onthc game performed considerably hctlcr than did
those who relied on learning by discovery.

R. C. Anderson, Kulhavy and Andre (I 972) found that the type of feed hack was also
cmcial to performance. In their view participants needed to arrive at the correct
answer by themselves because if participants were provided with the correct solution,
they leamcd only to copy the answer given by the examiner instead of learning the
skills to generate the answer themselves. So Anderson, ct al. argued it was important
to only give feedback indicating that an error had been made rather than giving the
solution.

Tl1e other significant variable in the skill acquisition equation is the role of working
memo!)'. Remembering specific items, concepts, solutions and rules plays a large
part in skill acquisition. Practice, accompanied with accurate feedback allows th(!
storage of exemplars, which can be used either as a direct solution to a problem
previously encountered, or as analogous to a new problem. This type of learning is
referred to as explicit teaming. It is dependent upon conscious processing and intent
to learn and is sensitive to work load (Kirsner & Speelman, 1998).

Working memo!)' is defined as a 11 systern for the temporal)' holding and
manipulation of information during the performance of a range of cognitive tasks"
(Baddeley, 1986, p.34) and theories of skill acquisition share common ground on the
role of memory in learning. In the novice stage of learning, knowledge and
instructions relevant to the perfonnance of?. task are held in working memo!)' and
assist in the development of a performance strategy or algorithm. With continued
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exposure to a task there is a refining and improving of'tlw algorithm and the
individual becomes more competent at pcr/'orming the task. The need to hold large;
amounts or infonnatinn in working memory declines and as such both thc: sizl! and
nature of demand is reduced. Over time there is a gradual shi fl from algorithmic
processing to memory retrieval, leading to automatic perfOrmance, as experience
with the task is increased (Anderson, 1983; Cheng, 1985; Logan, 1988; Newell, &
Rosenbloom, 198 I).

It is this concept of a transition from algorithmic processing to memory retrieval that

fom1s the basis for Logan's ( !988) instance theory of skill acquisition, which will be
reviewed in detail later in this review. It also highlights the central issue in the debate
over the specificity of skill transfer- is transfer from one task to another is based on
the number of shared task elements between the two tasks (Frensch, 1991, p. 997) or
is it a function of past exposure to the same situation. (Compton & Logan, 1991;
Logan, 1988; Logan & Klapp, 1991; Pennington, Nicolich, & Rahm, 1995).

Those theorists who support the 'shared elements' approach to transfer, argue that
when a person encounters a new situation or task, he/she would benefit from past
experience in proportion to the number of similarities between the old and new
situation (Anderson, 1983; Bovair, Kieras, & Polson, 1990; Kieras & Bovair, 1986;
Rosenbloom & Newell, 1987; Singley & Anderson, 1989). In contrast, those arguing
for the opposite view, state that transfer occurs only when both the old and new tasks
are identical.

SkiJI Acquisition and Task
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Edward Thorndike ( 1874-1949) was the pioneer of the 'shared clements' view or skill
transfCr. Early in his career, Thorndike moved to the Teacher's Training College at
Columbia University, and it was here tha1 his interest in Jcurning was channelled to
the domain of education. The assumption inherent in all training programs is that
skills learnt in the training environment will transfer to situations outside the
ci;.Jssroom.

It was this assumption that led Thorndike to fonnulatc his theory of transfer, which

holds that performance on a task is benefited by past experience only to the extent
that both tasks share the same components. Based on the foundation laid by
Thorndike, other associationists built their own arguments in support of the identical
elements theoty (Anderson, I 983; Crossman, 1959; Trowbridge & Carson, 1932).
Judd (1908), a contemporary of Thorndike, proposed the opposing view of transfer.

Judd argued that skills were highly constrained by the context in which they were
acquired and transfer from one task to another would only occur between items
experienced during training (Gagne, 1966; Hintzman, 1976).

Two modem theories of skill acquisition that characterise this dichotomy are Logan's
Instance Theory ofLeaming, which can be likened to the position held by Judd, and
Anderson's Adaptive Control ofThought Theory (ACT*), which is similar to the
view held by Thorndike. Both theories can account for most of the changes that

occur with learning and skilled behaviour, but they differ in tenns of the specificity
of transfer (Greig & Speelman, 1999).

Skill AClJILisition and Task

I

Logan's ( 1988, 1990) instance theory, fOr example, slates that skills <Jrc highly
specific to the environment in which they were learned. Therefore perfOrmance on a
new task would not be hcnclitcd by past learning. In contrast, Anderson's ( JIJR2,
1983, 1()S7, 1<NO, ! 992) ACT* theory holds that hecausc knowledge is abstract it
can be applied to situations beyond the training environment and skills can therefore
be general in nature.

Both these divergent positions have found support in empirical research, raising the
question of how can both views can be correct. One possible answer is that the nature
of the skill acquisition and therefore transfer to new items or events is dictated by the
nature of the tasks performed. Those tasks that result in specific transfer do so
because they are inherently specific; that is, there are no general features in the task
that can be incorporated into a general perfonnance strategy and so no such strategy
can be developed that would facilitate transfer to another version of the task.
Conversely, a task that demonstrates general transfer does so because it contains
properties that can be useful when used to perform a different version of the task.

Logan's Instance TheOJ)I
Logan's (1988, 1990, 1992) Instance Theory of Automisation states that learning is
based on exposure to specific events and that for each exposure a memory for that
event is stored. In this theory these memories are called instances. The more
exposure a person receives to a given stimulus the more instances are available lOr
retrieval.

8
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Logan <Jrgues that lltstcr reaction times (RT) on a task arc a function of the amount of
practice with the task a person has experienced. Faster retrieval of iniOrmation is a
direct result oft he increased number of instances available

I{Jr

retrieval mthcr than a

relincmcnt of a general solution strategy.

Logan's Instance Theory is fundamentally a memory based theory predicated upon
three main assumptions: (I) that encoding into memory occurs as an "obligatory,
unavoidable consequence of attention" to a stimulus (Logan, 1988, p. 493); (2) that
having attended to a stimulus, retrieval from memory of anything associated with the
stimulus is obligatory and unavoidable; and (3) that each individual encounter with a
stimulus is encoded, stored, and retrieved separately.

According to the instance theory, in the initial stages of learning, performance is
based on algorithmic processing with the person going through a number of steps to
find a solution. For example, in learning to multiply 4 x 5 a child might count 4 piles
of counters with 5 in each pile and then add the total number of counters to arrive at
the answer, 20. Each time this exercise is performed correctly an instance is stored in
memory. So that with repeated exposure to the problem 4 x 5 the child has more
instances of the answer 20 to draw upon and so is less likely to use the algorithm.
That is, rather than needing to generate the solution, the child simply remembers it.
The algorithm for solving the problem does not change, rather the database of
memory instances for the solution increases (Logan, 1988).

In addition to the three primary assumptions, Logan's Instance Theory also assumes
that each episode connected with a particular stimulus has an equal chance of
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rctrievnl so that every time a person performs a task, the memory prot:ess and the
algorithm compete in a metaphoric 'race'; the pro<.:ess thnt produces a solution first
controls the response. Retrieving an instance is simply rcc;tlling the p<JSI solution to
the problem, so the 'rnce' is in effect between generating a solution (i.e., algorithm)
and remembering an answer (i.e., instance). At the novice stag<.: there ar<.: f<.:w<.:r

instances available to retrieve, and so the algorithm is more likely to win the race and
control the response. As the individual becomes more skilled, a greater number of
instances are stored and the probability of one of them being retrieved faster than the
processing of the algorithm increases so that the memO I)' process eventually
dominates the race (Compton & Logan, 1991; Rickard, 1997).

Collectively these assumptions imply a learning mechanism that is based on the
''accumulation of separate episodic traces with experience" (Logan, 1988, p. 493)
whereby practice, and therefore an increased database of instances, ultimately results
in a tramdtion from algorithmic processing to memol)'-based processing. In addition,

it is this accumulation of separate episodes that makes the thcol)' an instance theory.
According to Logan's theory the only difference between skilled performers and the
novice is the number of instances that the expert has to draw upon.

One of the assumptions central to the instance theory is that encoding and rct:-icval
are both "obligatory and unavoidable" consequences of attending. Support for this
argument has been found in experiments involving incidental and intentional
learning where participants experienced the same stimulus but with one group being
instructed to attend to a specific aspect of the stimulus and the other group r•:cciving
no specific instruction (Boronat & Logan, 1997; Hyde & Jenkins, 1969; Logan &

Ill

EthL·rtun. JIN...J.; rvlandh:r. i'J(,7). For exampk, in the Boronat and Logan ( 1')1)7)
study Jlilrticip;,IJJ\s were presented with word pairs presented in ;1 I r, hlock training
session. Participants scan:hcd these word pairs f(Jr nH:rnbcrs of;J target category. The
results

or these experiments supporh.:d the assumption that information is cncndcd

whether it is spccilically attended to or not.

Another important aspect of Logan's theory concerns the strength of encoding.
Although Logan argues that encoding occurs automatically, and can offer
experimental support for his assertion, he counters this statement by saying that not
all infommtion is encoded to the same degree (Logan, 1988). Consequently the fact
that an individual is unable to retrieve infonnation relevant to a stimulus does not
mean necessarily that the infom1ation was not encoded, just that it was inadequately
encoded.

Due to the nature oftl:e instance theory, Logan predicts that there can not be any
transfer between tasks. According to Logan, skill acquisition is based on an
accumulation of instances that are highly specific to the stimuli encountered. As a
result, performance on new, albeit similar items, would not be enhanced by past
learning. Logan demonstrated this with his alphabet-arithmetic task (Logan, 1988;
Logan & Klapp, 1991) and with a spatial numerosity task (Lassaline & Logan,
1993). Both these tasks presented participants with a set of items in a training phase
and a mix of old and new items in a transfer phase. Reaction time for the old items
were faster than for the new items, which demonstrated that Ieaming from the
training phase of the experiment could not be of benefit to the pmticipant when tl.oy
were presented with new items in the transfer phase. This implies that new problems,
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hetwt:enth~.:m,

an.: treated as iftlwy an.: totally new

(Greig & Speelman, liJIJlJ).

Palmeri ( 1997) expressed concern over the instance theory's metaphorical "race".
The theory states that there can only be onr.: "winner" and so implies that it is the first
instance retrieved tlmt dictates the response. This aspect of the theory offers no
possibi lily of comparison of responses where evidence in support of one response
automatically negates all others (Palmeri, 1997). This raises the possibility that the
first instance retrieved might not be the best or most appropriate solution to the
problem.

Palmeri ( 1997) and Rickard ( 1997) have both extended the instance theory to include
the possibility of retrieving instances that are not identical to the stimulus
encountered. Palmeri, with his exemplar-based random walk model (EBR W) states
that all examples of an instance are retrieved in direct proportion to their similarity to
the presented stimuli. This means that if a new problem is encountered that is similar

to:. but not identical to:. an instance held in memory, that instance could be retrieved
to assist in solving the new problem.

Rickard's component power laws theory (CMPL) offers an alternative to the parallel
competition between algorithm execution and memory retrieval described by the
instance theory. Rickard suggests that instead of the two processes competing
independently in paraUel, that a choice of strategy (i.e., either algorithm execution or
memory retrieval) is made at the outset of each trial and a prototype of each item is
strengthened with practice. While this model precludes parallel completion it does
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not pn.·cludc parallel initi:.1tion oflwo or more memory rdrit:v;tl event~. lllt:ref'on.:, tl

allows the possibility ofmon; than one solution heing considered (Riekard, l'J!J7).

Anderst111's AC'T* '"l'lu'tJJ:I·
Anderson's ACT* Theory proposes that skilled behaviour can he considered as

involving the execution of production rules (Anderson, 1995) which Anderson
described as one of the "most astounding and important discoveries in psychology"
(Anderson, 1993, p. l). Production rules arc 'if- then' or 'condition-action'
statements . When the 'if component is matched with infonnation stored in memory a
particular outcome or action is perfonned - the 'then' component (Anderson, 1993 ).
With practice, execution of these productions becomes more efficient and therefore
faster. Thus a general strategy for perfonning is developed and refined with practice
on the task (Pirolli & Anderson, 1985).

Underlying Anderson's theory is the distinction between declarative and procedural
knowledge. Declarative knowledge is knowledge about facts, whereas procedural
knowledge is the "how" of an action or procedure. Anderson states that these two
types of knowledge differ fundamentally in their role in skill acquisition (Anderson,
1982). The use of declarative infommtion to perforn1 a task is slow and ponderous in

that every fact relating to a stimulus has to be retrieved from long-tem1 memory
before it can be held in short tenn memory for assessment in terms of its
appropriateness to the situation. This declarative infonnation can be operated on by
general problem solving processes such as analogy or means-end analysis. These
problem-solving processes are referred to as weak because they can be applied to a
range of problems and are not tied to any particular problem type. Application or

II
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these processes result in the limnation of productions that !Cmn lhl! basis or
procedural knowledge.

According to the ACT* tlwory. skill acquisition typically comprises three stages; tlu;

Declarative Sltlgc, the

1\null'h·t~r;e

Compilation Sfllge, and finally the Procedural

Stage. In effect, the ACT* is a reinterpretation of the three stages of skill acquisition
described by Fitts ( 1964 ). Fitts described the Cognitive Stage, which corresponds to
Anderson's declarative stage, as involving initial skill acquisition. This stage is
characterised as being explicit and rule-based, making it slow, resource intensive and
mistake ridden. Schneider and Shiffrin (I 977) suggest this stage is highly demanding
of attention and is governed by the limits ofshort-tenn memory. During this stage
the skill is being mastered so teclmiques such as verbal rehearsal are often employed
to aid performance (Shiffiin & Schneider, 1977)

The second stage in Fitts' model is the Associative Stage (Anderson's knowledge
compilation stage), which involves the refinement of the skill. Initial mistakes are
corrected and the individual becomes less hesitant as familiarity with the task
increases. Finally, in the Autonomous Stage, (the procedural stage in ACT*), skill
gradually improves as a direct result of practice on the task and perfonnance
becomes more automatic (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider,
1977;Speelman & Maybery, 1998).

According to ACT* any improvement in perfonnance is a consequence of
composition, proceduralisation and strengthening. Composition involves several
production rules being collapsed or refined into simpler rules that achieve the same
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goal. To illustrate the com:cpt Spcdman and Maybcry (I 1J!JX, p. XX)

prc~entcd

Ihe

following example or live produetion rules being composed into one in Ihe solution
or an algebraic equati<lll:

IF
THEN

goal is to solvt.: fOr x in the equation a"" x -1- c
set <IS sub-goal to isolate x on RHS of equation

( I)

IF
THEN

goal is to isolate x on RHS of equation
set as sub-goal to eliminate c from RHS of equation

(2)

IF
THEN

goal is to eliminate c from RHS of equation
add -c to both sides of equation

(3)

IF

goal is to solve for x in the equation
And x has been isolated on RHS of equation
LHS of equation is solution for x

(4)

THEN

After perfom1ing these production rules for the solution of the equation, composition
will result in productions 2 and 3 being collapsed into a new production rule:

IF
THEN

goal is to isolate x on RHS of equation
add -c to both sides of equation

(5)

Further practice would result in productions I, 4 and 5 being collapsed into a single
sophisticated production rule:

IF
THEN

goal is to solve for x in equation of the fom1 a= x + c
s!lbtract c from a and the result is the solution

Thus the goal is achieved with only one production rule as apposed to the original
five. The critical aspect to note here is the reduction in the number of processing
steps results in faster processing and execution of the task but does not change the
goal or nature of the task (Anderson, I983),

(6)

Sktll Acqmsllitl!l and rasJ..

Pwccdumli:;oltion

rcprcs~..:nts

the transition from slow (b:larativc

knowll:dg~.;

to faster

automat it: procedural knowkdgc. It occurs by integrating donwin specific
inform:Hion into gcncra! productions, thereby n!slricting the re:.dm of':.tpplication of
the production and eliminating the need to maintain large amounts of general
knowledge in working memory (Anderson, JIJ83). This reduction in demand on
working memory results in an improvement in both speed and accuracy of
pcrfonnance.

Finally, eyery time a production is successfully applied the production gains strength,
resulting in a higher probability that it will be utilised in fut.Jre. However, unlike
compilation and proceduralisation, strengthening does not qualitatively change the
productions and is associated with smaller improvements in perfonnance. Hence it is
often associated with the flattening of the learning curve as it approaches asymptote
(Anderson, 1983).

Contrary to Logan's Instance Theory, ACT* predicts transfer of skills from one
domain to another depending on the number of shared productions (Singley &
Anderson, 1989). Thus transfer between tasks that share the same strategy should be
high although not necessarily complete. Although Anderson (1983) has reported
evidence in support of this view of transfer, there has been some criticism of this
view. For example, Carlson and Schneider (1989) suggested that it is difficult to
identify which productions are actually utilised in any particular task and that
production models can be devised post hoc to account for any amount of transfer,
making it virtually impossible to falsify the theory.

"'
Anderson (I t)87) recognises this alh.:gation and agn.:cs that it is di nic•.dt to prl!dict the

amount oftransl'cr that will occur because participants an.: unahk to vcrhalise the
actual productions in usc. However, empirical research has consistently supported
tl1c prediction that transfer will occur between tasks as a function oft11c amount of
shared procedural knowledge that exists between the tasks (Corbett & Anderson,

1992; Greig & Speelman, J9!J9; Frcnsch, 1991; Kicrus & Bovair, 1986; Singley &
Anderson. 1989; Speelman & Kirsncr, 1997).

Trr.nsfer
Skill transfer is referred to as the degree to which skills obtained in one area assist in
the acquisition or implementation of skills in another area (Greig & Speelman,
1999). In addition, transfer is considered to be general when the skills acquired on
one task can be used to assist in the performance of a different task (Masson, 1986 ).
Conversely, transfer is considered specific when skills cannot be generalised to other

tasks (Masson, 1986).

The ACT* and instance theories make different predictions relating to transfer. As
mentioned previously ACT* states that transfer between tasks will occur as a
function of the number of shared productions between the tasks. The amount of

transfer is directly related to how applicable the production rules developed with one
task are to the perfonnance of another task; the more closely the two tasks are related
the greater the amount of transfer (Anderson, 1982, 1987). This is not to say that the
tasks themselves have to be similar. Singley and Anderson ( 1989) demonstrated that
negative and zero transfer can occur between tasks that on the surface appear to be

alike. So it is the shared abstract components not superficial similarity oftasks that
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dil·tatcs transfer (Anderson, I t)87; Frcnsch, llJ 1) I; Rosc.;nbloom, & Nc.;wcl I, I 1JI-ifJ;

Schneider & Fisk, JtJ84; Speelman & Kirsncr, Jt)!J7).

In contrast. Logan predicts that there can be no transfer between tasks because skill
acquisition is based on past instances ofpcrforming a task. Experience of one
situation cannot advantage the individual in a new situation because there can he no
stored infonnation pertaining to the new situation (Logan, 1988; 1990; Rickard, 1997;
Rickard, Healy & Bourne, 1994 ). Logan (1988) supported this position with a se•·ies
of experiments based on both lexical decision and alphabet-arithmetic tasks.

In the alphabet-arithmetic task participants were presented with an equation such as
A+ 3 = D to which they were required to respond "True" or "False". Participants
experienced one half of the alphabet in the training phase and the other half in the
test phase. Logan found that learning from the first phase of the experiment did not
transfer to the second phase- participants were as slow at the beginning of the
second phase as they were at the beginning of the first phase. From this he concluded
that skill acquisition and transfer were specific to the items experienced during
training and that no general learning had occurred (Logan, 1988; Logan & Klapp,
1991).

Similar results were found in the lexical decision task where Logan presented
participants with 10 words and 10 non-words, repeated 16 times in the training
phase. During the transfer phase participants were shown the old items as well as I 0
new words and 10 new non-words again repeated 16 times. Reaction times for the
new items demonstrated a slight practice effect over blocks, but the reaction time

IH
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data for the old items dl'en..:ased substantially hoth ahsolutely ;_md relative to the new
item controls. Because these RT reductions occurred

f(Jr

hoth words and non-words,

Logan int erprt.:tcd these resu ]Is as fu rthcr evidence oft he speci lie nature or ski JJ
acq uisi Iion.

In a study using typographically transformed words Masson ( 1980) found skill
transfer to be highly specific and occurring only when training and test trials shared
the same letters in the same case. The experiment involved participants reading
words comprised of letters that had been reversed through their vertical axis and <;o
presented as mirror in1ages of the actual letter. In the training phase of the
experiment participants were presented with words using only 13 letters of the
alphabet. In the test phase Masson ( 1986) presented three different conditions; words
encountered in training, new words using old letters and new words using new
letters. The logic behind the experiment was that if participants developed a general
algorithm for reading mirror-reversed letters this should generalise to the new words
and assist in the reading. If on the other hand transfer was specific to the words
encountered during training, only those words would be recognised. Masson found
the latter case to be true in that the ability to identify one set of words did not transfer
to another, different set of words even if those words contained previously
encountered letters (Masson, 1986).

Research by Rickard (1997) using a pound arithmetic task also offers support for the
specificity of transfer. Solving pound arithmetic problems such as 4 # 17 = ?,
involves the execution of a simple three-step algorithm. The first step is to subtract
the left-hand side of the equation from the right-hand side (i.e., 17-4 = 13). Second,
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1 is alhkd to dte result of step I (i.e., l.l

-!-

I = 14).

Fint.~lly

the rcsull of stt;p 2 is

added to the right-lwnd number (i.e., 17 -f- 14 = .ll ). The experiment involved six
separate sessions and comprised of 15 - 21 blocks of trials. The transfer phase
occurred immediately a Her the firth session and comprised 18 old and new problems.
Mean RT

ror the old problems were significantly different to the RT for the new

problems, which demonstrated that learning on this task was highly specific to the
items encountered during training.

Lassaline and Logan ( 1993) offered further evidence in support of the specific nature
of skill transfer with their spatial numerosity task. Spatial patterns of between 6 and
11 items were presented to participants who were then required to judge the number
of items in each pattern. In the training phase, reaction times increased in a linear
relationship with the number of items in the pattern, which would suggest that
participants were counting the items in each pattern and so were using an algorithm
to perfom1 the task. After practicing the task with a fixed set of patterns over a
number of days, there was no difference in response times regardless of the number
of items in the pattern. This implies that participants had ceased counting the items
and had remembered the number of items in each pattern and so had begun to use
memory recall to perform the task. The transfer phase was conducted 12 days later,
at which time participants were presented with new patterns. RT returned to the same
level as at the beginning of training indicating that no transfer had occurred between
the old and new patterns.

However, Palmeri (I 997) extended the Lassaline and Logan task by including in the
transfer phase patterns that were similar to the old patterns. So in the training phase

l()
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participants saw one set of patterns then in the transfer phase tln:y wcn.: prcscntcd
with the old p1.1ttcrns. new patterns that were similar hut not identical to the old
patterns. and patterns that were completely diiTcrcnt. The n.:sults oft he transf{:r phase
showed that RT for the old patterns was fastest hut RT for the similar patterns were
faster than RT fOr the new patterns. So transfer occurred in the Palmeri study but not
in the Lassalinc and Logan study which used the same task. The results from
Palmeri's study indicate that the specific nature of skill transfer can be infl ucnccd by
the similarity of stored instances. It also indicates that transfer in a particular tas'

an

be influenced by the training conditions.

Further investigation by Speelman and Kirsner (1997) using syllogistic reasoning
indicated a more general transfer of skill from training to test situation. Participants
were required to respond 'True' or 'False' to a series of syllogisms presented via a
computer screen in the format:

All artists are beekeepers
All beekeepers are chemists
All artists are chemists

The first two premises were presented to participants, after which they pressed
READY, and the premises disappeared and the conclusion appeared on the screen.
At this stage participants had to decide whether the conclusion was 'true' or 'false 1

based on the information in the first two premises.

Although none ofthe syllogisms were repeated, they all followed the same fonnat
and this allowed a general solution to be applied to all problems. Speelman and
Kirsner (1997) found that because the participants improved in their ability to solve

/I
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the syllogisms when there was no repetition of itl!lllS it was an indication of gc.:nt:rul
transfer. Participants had learned the solutiontcclmiquc and applied it to all new
syllogism.., (Speelman & Kirsncr, I997).

Positive transfer has nlso been shown to occur in category search tasks (Schneider &
Fisk, 1984). During training participants were presented with lists of three words,
one of which would be a member of a target category. For example, participants had
to identify \vhich word from the list house, tractor and sword belonged to the
category weapon. In the transfer phase participants were given the same categories
but had to search for a different word (i.e., gun instead of sword). Because
participants were easily able to identify the new word as being a member of a
particular category it demonstrated high positive transfer had occurred.

Other research shows that transfer can be both general and specific in the same task.
Greig and Speelman (1999) developed an algebraic equation task x' + 2y

~with

a

range of values being substituted for x andy. In the training phase, participants were
presented with a small set ofx, y pairs, with each pair being presented several times.
Phase two comprised the same equation but with a different set ofx, y values each
presented several times. The results indicated that although reaction times slowed at
the beginning of phase two compared to the end of phase one, participants were still
faster than in the initial stages of training, demonstrating that some benefit was
obtained from the training. Greig and Speelman concluded that, because RT at the
beginning of phase 2 was faster than at the beginning of phase 1, participants must
have learned something general about the task that could be transferred to phase

~

when a different set ofx andy pairs were presented. However, according to Greig
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and Speelman. the f<.Jcl that performance was slowed from the end of phase ont: to tht:
beginning of phase two implies that the skills acquired in phase one were to some
extent specific to the individual x, y pairs presented during phase one.

The Relations/tip hetweC'n Task and Tramfer

Clearly there is some discrepancy in the literature as to the nature of skill acquisition
and its transfer. Masson ( 1986) and Logan ( 1988) both found that learning was
highly specific and that transfer could not occur between old and nc·.v items.
Speelman and Kirsner (1997) and Schneider and Fisk (1984) demonstrated that
transfer was general when a new task could be solved using the same strategy as an
old task. Additionally, transfer has also been shown to be both general and specific
(Greig & Speelman, 1998).

The theories proposed to account for the way in which skills are acquired is also
contradictory in nature. Logan 1s instance theory states that transfer of learning can
only occur when an identical situation to the one involved in training is encountered,
which highlights a fundamental flaw in the theory because other research has
demonstrated that transfer to new items can occur (Greig & Speelman, 1998;
Speelman & Kirsner, 1997). Both ACT* and EBRW suggest that transfer can occur
depending on the training circumstances. All this leaves the initial question as to
whether skills obtained in the training environment can be generalised beyond the
classroom largely unresolved. The conflicting nature ofthe research results on the
subject, as well as the contradictory theoretical opinions, suggests that no equivocal
answer is possible at present.

Skill

A~qu1Sl11on
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There is an obvious nc~.:d li.1r clarilication of the situation to determine what
cnmbin:~tion

of circumstances during training lc:~ds to effCctiVl! transli.:r. ·1 hr.!

conflicting evidence com pi h:d so fl1r suggests that the disparity of rl.!sults might hr.!
due to the disparate nature of the tasks involved. Some tasks such as the syllog1srn
task used by Speelman and Kirsncr ( 191J7) may have inherent properties that make
transfer from one domain to another more effective. Whereas other tasks like the
reverse reading task used by Masson ( 1986} might not contain these clements and so
transfer is restricted to the items experienced during training.

For example the syllogism task could be solved by identifying the common clements
in the two premises and drawing a conclusion about the uncommon clements based
on their position in the syllogism. Thus when the conclusion was presented, a
decision pertaining to its accuracy could be made quickly. Based on the example
given earlier
All artists are beekeepers
All beekeepers are chemists
All artists are chemists

the common element is 'beekeeper'. By then reading the uncommon elements (i.e.,
artist and chemist) from left to right one detennines that all artists are chemists so
that when the conclusion is presented it is easy to respond 'true' quickly. Once this
strategy is identified by a participant the nature and order of the content words
becomes irrelevant, and the strategy is applicable to all syllogisms presented in this
manner.
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C'onvcr.sely. in the reverse reading task u.sed by Masson, learning to read the word
C'AT prese!1ted in mirror reverse print in the training phase oftlw experiment
represented no value to the participant who had to read PEN presented in mirror
reverse print in the transfer phase. The two tasks share no common ground and no
strategy could be developed that would assist in the transfi::r or learning from one
phase to another.

The same argument can be applied to the other tasks used to assess transfer. For
instance, in the Schneider and Fisk ( 1984) category search task, identifying that the
word table belongs to the category furniture when presented with the list dog, table,
and car is not particularly onerous. So when the participant is presented with the
word chair in the transfer phase there is no reason why the recognition that it also
belongs to the category furniture should take any longer than in the training phase.
Consequently it can be argued that the knowledge required to perfonn this task was
so general as to not impede perfonnance when the items were cl1 r:nged.

Conversely the pound alphabet task used by Rickard (1997) would require the same
level of processing in the transfer phase as in the training phase. Although the
solution of the equation involves the same three specific steps in both phases, each
time the numbers were changed new calculations would be needed and so it is
unlikely that much improvement could be made in reaction times once the algorithm
had been mastered. Therefore it is unlikely that learning from the training phase
could be beneficial to the participant in the transfer phase and so not such transfer
could occur.

Skill AClJllisition and Task
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By devising an experiment that presented these tasks under unifi:Jrm administration
conditions that allowed direst comparison of the tasks, it might he possible to
identify whether or not trans!Cr is predicated upon inherent properties of the task
itscl f rather than the tntining conditions per se. If transfer occurred in any of these

tasks under controlled conditions, it should be possible to identify which properties
in the task enabled transfer.

Conclusion
Evidently there is a degree of conflict in the literature as to the speci fie nature of skill
transfer and it begs the question of how can transfer be specific in some experiments
but demonstrate general transfer in others. The answer appears to lie with the task
itself and whether or not it contains properties that can be incorporated into a general
solution strategy for performing the task. When a task does contain those properties,
as in the syllogism task and the category search task, transfer is likely to be general.
If on the other hand the task contains no such properties, as in the reverse reading
task, the pound arithmetic task and the alphabet-arithmetic task, no general solution
strategy can be developed and so transfer is likely to be specific to the items
encountered during training.

Of greater concern is the evidence obtained from the spatial numerosity task, which
demonstrated specific transfer in the Lassaline and Logan ( 1993) experiment and
then showed partial positive transfer in the Palmeri (1997) study. The results from
these two experiments cast doubt over the veracity of Logan's instance theory
because in its present form, the instance theory is unable to account for the different
levels of transfer that occurred using the same task.
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Logan ( 1988, 1990, 19'!2; Logan & Klapp, I'J91) clearly and emphatically stales that

prior learning can only be beneficial in pcr/Onning a new task when both the old and
new tasks arc identical. The Palmeri ( 1997) study clearly illustratcs that past
experience can be analogous to a new situation and this presents a serious problem
for the instance theory as there is no provision within the theory to account for
pertbrmance on a new task benefiting from past experiences that arc similar to tnc
new task.

Understandably, Logan developed his theory based on the results of his own
research. This involved experiments using the lexical decision task, the alphabetarithmetic task and spatial numerosity task, none of which contain properties that are
likely to result in a general solution strategy being developed. Therefore it is not
surprising that the experiments resulted in specific transfer. However, when the
spatial numerosity task was presented in a format that enabled participants to benefit
from prior exposure to the task it resulted in partial positive transfer.

The conflicting results from the Lassaline and Logan (1993) and Palmeri (1997)
experiments alone provide the impetus not only for more detailed investigation of the
nature of transfer but also for the refinement of the instance theory itself. Presented
in concert with the all the other evidence relative to the specificity of transfer, the
only logical conclusion to be drawn is that the nature of skill transfer is a function of
the task involved.
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The Specificity of Skill acquisition: Is it Task Related?
Skill transf'er refers to the degree to which skills ohtained in one area assist in the
acquisition or implementation of skills in another area (Greig & Speelman, 1999). In
addition, transfer is considered to be general when the skills acquired on one task can
be used to assist in the perfom1ance of a different task (Masson, 1986). Conversely,
transfer is considered specific when skills cannot be generalised to other tasks
(Masson, 1986).

Research in this area has generated some conflicting results offering no clear
understanding of whether skill acquisition and transfer are specific or general or
both. On one side of the debate are theorists who support the 'shared elements'
approach to transfer, who argue that when a person encounters a new situation or
task, he/she would benefit from past experience in proportion to the number of
similarities between the old and new situation (Anderson, 1983; Bovair, Kieras, &
Polson, 1990; Kieras & Bovair, 1986; Rosenbloom & Newell, 1987; Singley &
Anderson, 1989). In contrast, those arguing for the opposite view state that transfer
occurs only when both the old and new task are identical (Compton & Logan, 1991;
Logan & Klapp 1993; Logan, 1988, 1990, 1992; Pennington, Nicolich, &
Rahm, 1995).

Two modem theories of skill acquisition that characterise this dichotomy of opinions
are Logan's Instance Theory of Learning and Anderson's Adaptive Control of
Thought Theory (ACT*). Both theories can account for most ofthe changes that
occur with learning and skilled behaviour, but they differ in terms ofthe specificity
of transfer (Greig & Speelman, 1999). Logan's theory predicts that skills are specific
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to the contexts in which they arc acquired and Anderson's ACT* Theory predicts
both general and specific skills depending on the training conditions.

Logan's lm>'lallce 1'lwo1:1'

Logan's ( 1988, 1990, 1992) Instance Theory of Automisation states that learning is
based on exposure to specific events and that for each exposure a memory is stored.
These memories arc called instances in this theory. The more exposure a person
receives to a given stimulus the more instances are available for retrieval. Logan
argues that faster reaction times (RT's) on a task are a function of the amount of
practice with a task a person has experienced. Faster retrieval of information is a
direct result of the increased number of instances available for retrieval rather than
refinement of a general solution strategy.

Logan's Instance Theory is fundamentally a memory based theory predicated upon
three main assumptions: Firstly that encoding into memory occurs as an "obligatory,
unavoidable consequence of attention" to a stimulus (Logan, 1988, p. 493); secondly,
that having attended to a stimulus, retrieval from memory of anything associated
with the stimulus is obligatory and unavoidable; and thirdly, that each individual
encounter with a stimulus is encoded, stored and retrieved separately.

The accumulation of separate memories, or instances, of a particular situation or
stimulus results in a leaming mechanism whereby practice ultimately results in a
transition from algorithmic processing to memory-based processing (Logan, 1988).
Logan argues that each episode connected with a particular stimulus has an equal
chance of retrieval so that every time a person perfonns a task the memory process
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and the algorithm compete in a metaphoric 'race'; the process that produces a
solution !irst controls the response. Rctricving an instancc is simply recalling the pust
solution to the problem, so the 'race' is in effect between generating a solution (i.e.,
algorithm) and remembering an answer (i.e., instance). In the novice stage there arc
fewer instances available for retrieval and so the algorithm is more likely to win. As
the individual becomes more skilled, a greater number of instances are stored and
this increases the probability of one of them being retrieved faster than the
processing of the algorithm. Consequently, instance retrieval eventually dominates
the race (Compton & Logan, 1991; Rickard, 1997).

Due to the nature of the instance theory, Logan predicts that there can not be any
transfer between tasks. According to Logan, skill acquisition is based on an
accumulation of instances that are highly specific to the stimuli encountered. As a
result, perfonnance on a new task, albeit with similar stimulus conditions, would not
be enhanced by past learning. This implies that new problems, regardless of any
similarity to old problems, are treated as if they are completely new (Greig &
Speelman, 1999).

Palmeri (1997) extended to the instance theory by allowing past experience to benefit
current perfonnance on a task if the two tasks involved similar stimuli. In his
exemplar-based random walk model (EBRW), Palmeri incorporates both Logan's
instance theory and Nosofsky's (!986) generalised context model of categorisation
(GCM). In Palmeri's EBRW model, instances are retrieved with rates proportional to
their similarity to the current stimulus, therefore providing the flexibility needed for
similarity between stimuli to be of benefit in performing a task.
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Anderson:\· ACT* 1'lwo1:V

Underlying Anderson's theory is the distinction between declarative and procedural
knowledge. Dcclarativl.: knowledge is what an individual knows- knowledge ahout
facts- whereas procedural knowledge is the 'how' of an action or procedure.
Anderson states that these two types of knowledge differ fundamentally in their role
in skill acquisition (Anderson, 1983).

The use of declarative infonnation is slow and ponderous in that every fact relating
to a stimulus has to be retrieved from long-term memory before it can be held in
short tem1 memory for assessment in terms of its appropriateness to the situation.
This declarative information is then operated on by weak problem solving processes
such as analogy or means-end analysis. These problem solving processes are referred
to as weak because they can be applied to a range of problems and are not tied to any
particular problem type. This process results in the formation of production rules that
form the basis of procedural knowledge.

Production rules are a series of'if- then' or 'condition-action' statements such that
when the 'if component is matched with information stored in mem('lty a particular
outcome or action is performed -the 'then' component (Anderson, 1983). With
practice execution of these productions becomes more efficient and therefore faster.
Thus a general strategy for performing is developed and refined with practice on the
task (Pirolli & Anderson, 1985).

According to ACT* any improvement in performance is a consequence of
composition, proceduralisation and strengthening. Composition involves several
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production rules being collapsed or rcfmcd into simpler rules. These new rules must
occur in sequence and share the same ultimate goal; they just achieve the result in
fewer steps (Anderson. I983 ). The critical aspect to note here is the reduction in
processing steps results in lltstcr processing and execution of the task but docs not
change the goal or nature of the task (Anderson, !983).

Proceduralisation represents the transition from slow declarative knowledge to faster
<tutomatic procl!dural knowledge. It occurs by integrating domain specific
information into productions, thereby restricting the realm of application of the
production and eliminating the need to maintain large amounts of general knowledge
in working memory (Anderson, 1983). This reduction in demand on working
memory results in an improvement in both speed and accuracy of perfonnance.

Finally, every time a production is successfully applied the production gains strength
resulting in a higher probability that it will be utilised in future. However, unlike
compilation and proceduralisation, strengthening does not qualitatively change the
productions and is associated with smaller improvements in performance. Hence it is
often associated with the flattening of the learning curve as it approaches asymptote
(Anderson, 1983).

Contrary to Logan's Instance Theory, ACT* predicts transfer of skills from one
domain to another depending on the nutnber of productions developed to perfom1
one task that can be utilised in perfonning a second task (Singley & Anderson,
1989). Thus transfer between tasks that share the same strategy should be high
although not necessarily complete. Although Anderson ( 1982, 1987) has reported
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evidence in support of this view oftnmsfer, there has been some criticism of' this
view. For example, Carlson and Schneider (I 989) suggested that it is difficult to
identify which productions nrc actually utilised in any particular task and that
production models can be devised post hoc to account for any amount oftransfer,
making it virtually impossible to falsify the theory.

Anderson (1987) recognises this criticism and agrees that it is difficult to predict the
amount of transfer that will occur because participants are unable to verbalise the
actual productions in use. However, empirical research has consistently supported
the prediction that transfer will occur between tasks as a function of the amount of
shared procedural knowledge necessary to perform the task (Corbett & Anderson,
1992; Greig & Speelman, 1999; Frensch, 1991; Kieras & Bovair, 1986; Singley &
Anderson, 1989; Speelman & Kirsner, 1997).

Transfer
The ACT* and instance theories make different predictions relating to transfer. As
mentioned previously, ACT* states that transfer between tasks will occur as a
function of the number of shared productions between the tasks. The amount of
transfer is directly related to how applicable the production rules developed with one
task are to the performance of another task; the more closely the two tasks are related
the greater the amount oftransfer (Anderson, 1982, 1987). This is not to say that the
similarity of tasks is all that determines transfer. Singley and Anderson ( 1989)
demonstrated that negative and zero transfer could occur between tasks that on the
surface appear to be alike. So it is the shared components not superficial similarity of

Skill Acquisition and Task

II

tasks that dictates transrer (Anderson, I 987; Frcnsch, IIJIJ I; Ncwcll & Rosenbloom,
198(1; Speelman & Kirsncr. I997).

In contrast, Logan predicts that there can be no transfer between tasks <.IS skill
acquisition is bused on past instances of performing a task. Experience of one
situation cannot advantage the individual in a new situation because there can be no
stored infomuttion pertaining to the new situation (Logan, 1988; 1990). Logan
( 1988) supported this position with a series of experiments based on both lexical
decision and alphabet-arithmetic tasks. In the alphabet-arithmetic experiments
participants were presented with an equation such as A+ 3 c: D to which they were
required to respond "Tme" or "False". Participants experienced one half of the
alphabet in the training phase and the other half in the test phase. Logan found that
learning from phase one did not transfer to phase two of the experiment- participants
were as slow at the beginning of the second phase as they were at the beginning of
the first phase. From this he concluded that skill acquisition and transfer were
specific to the items experienced during training and that no general learning had
occurred (Logan, 1988; Logan & Klapp, 1991 ).

In a different study using typographically transformed words, Masson ( 1986) found
skill transfer to be highly specific, occurring only when training and test trials shared
the same specific features. The experiment involved participants reading words
comprised of letters that had been reversed through their vertical axis and so
presented as mirror images of the actual letter. In the training first phase of the
experiment participants were presented with words using only 13 letters of the
alphabet. In the test phase Masson presented three different conditions; words

JH
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encountered in training, new words using old letters and new words using new
letters.

The logic behind Masson's experiment was that if participants developed a general
algorithm for reading

mirror~rcversed

letters this should generalise to the new words

and assist in the reading. If on the other hand tra:-~sf'cr was specific to the words
encountered during training, only those words encountered during training would be
recognised. Masson found that the ability to identify one set of words did not transfer
to another, different set of words even if those words contained previously
encountered letters (Masson, 1986).

Further investigation by Speelman and Kirsner (1997) using syllogistic reasoning
indicated a more general transfer of skill from training to test situation. Participants
were required to solve a series of syllogisms. Although none of the syllogisms were
repeated, they all possessed the same structure and this allowed a general solution to
be applied to all problems. Speelman and Kirsner (1997) found that because the
participants improved in their ability to solve the syllogisms when there was no
repetition of items it was an indication of general transfer. Participants had learned
the solution technique and applied it to all new syllogisms (Speelman & Kirsner,
1997).

Other research shows that transfer can be both general and specific in the same task.
2 2
Greig and Speelman (1999) developed an algebraic equation task .r + .1' = A with
2
a range of values being substituted for x andy. In the training phase, participants
were presented with a small set of x and y pairs with each pair being presented
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several times. Phase two comprised the same equation hut with a dif/i.;rent set of' x
andy values each presented several times. The results indicated that although
reaction times slowed at the beginning of phase two compared to the end of phase
one, participants were still faster than in the initial stages of training demonstrating
that some bcne!it was obtained from the training. Greig and Speelman concluded
that, because RT at the beginning of phase two was faster than at the beginning of
phase I. participants must have learned something general about the task that could
be transferred to phase 2 when a different set ofx andy pairs were presented.
However, according to Greig and Speelman, the fact that perfonnancc was slowed
from the end of phase one to the beginning of phase two implies that the skills
acquired in phase one were to some extent specific to the individual x andy pairs
presented during phase one.

The Present Study
Clearly there is some discrepancy in the literature as to the nature of skill acquisition
and its transfer. Masson ( 1986) and Logan ( 1988) both found that leaming was
highly specific and that transfer could not occur between old and new items.
Speelman and Kirsner (1997) demonstrated that transfer was general when a new
task could be solved using the same strategy as in an old task. Additionally, Greig &
Speelman (1998) showed that transfer could be both general and specific.

The hypothesis under test in the present study was that conflicting evidence
regarding the specificity of skills is task related. That is, the task itsclfprcdicts the
amount of learning (skill acquisition) and therefore the amount of transfer that
occurs. Those tasks that result in specific skill transfer do so because they are
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inherently specific; that is, there arc no li::atures in the task that can he incorporatt:d
into a general perrormancc strategy and so no such strategy can he developed that
could l'acilitatc transfer to another version of the task. Conversely a task that
demonstrates general transll:r docs so because it contains properties that can he
use rut when used to perform a different version of the task. Each of the four tasks
highlighted above differs in its ability to develop general skills. The Masson reversed
word task involves people learning to read words with the letters presented in mirror
reversed fonn. It is unlikely that exposure to the letter C presented backwards in the
training phase can assist the participant when he/she is presented with the letter F
presented backwards in the transfer phase. Thus no general strategy is likely to be
developed that can transfer from one phase to the next.

The same appears to be true for the alphabet-arithmetic task used in the Logan
experiments. Being presented with A + 3 = D during training if unlikely to provide
any benefit when it comes to solving G + 4 =Kin the transfer phase. These two
problems, for example, involve different regions of the alphabet, and so counting
through the alphabet to solve each problem would not involve any of the same
letters. The only element that the two problems share is counting and it is likely that
for most of the participants in Logan's study, the ability to count was already at the
optimal level. Thus there appears little that one could learn about this task with one
set of!etters that could transfer to perfonning the same task with a different set of
letters.

In contrast the syllogism task developed by Speelman and Kirsncr ( 1997)
demonstrated general transfer because all the syllogisms could be solved using the
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same strategy, thus making the content and format of the syllogisms irrclcv<Jn! in
terms oft he participants ability to solve them. In the Greig and Speelman algebra
task transrer was shown to he both general and specific. Purticipants were uhlc to
learn the steps involved in solving the equation in phase one and transfCr that
knowledge across to phase two because the format of the equation remained constant
throughout the equation. However, because the values for x andy changed in the
second phase. no learning in tem1s of the actual x- y pairs from phase one could be
transferred to phase two. Thus transfer in tenns of the x- y pairs was specific and
transfer in tenus of the equation was general.

The aim of the present study was to test the two predictions; (1) that if learning
occurred in the absence of repeated items it should predict transfer in the task from
one set of items to another and; (2) the nature of the task will detem1ine the
specificity of that transfer. If learning occurs without repetition of items, this would
suggest that participants do not rely on memory for past solutions, but instead use an
algorithm to perfonn the task. That is, in the early stages of performance, when RT is
slower, participants develop a strategy to perfom1 the task. With practice on the task
the algorithm is refined so that performance is faster and more efficient.

If learning occurs under these conditions it would be logical to assume that when
participants are presented with a different version of the task that the likelihood of
transfer occurring would be dictated by the efficiency of the algorithm. The
specificity ofthe transfer would depend on the obility of the strategy to generalise to
a different item set. Ifthe task londs itself to a general solution strategy, that strategy
should apply when different items are presented within the framework oft he same
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task. Irthc task generates a strategy that is dependent upon the specific items being
presented, then the strategy will not generalise to the new items and transfer would
not occur.

To test these assumptions the experiment was divided into three phases and the four
tasks highlighted earlier were all compared directly. Phase one of the experiment was
designed to examine the amount of learning that occurred in the absence of repeated
items. If learning occurred during this phase it would indicate the development of an
algorithm that could be used to perfonn the task regardless of the actual items
presented and therefore should predict the amount of transfer that occurred in the
transfer phase. Based on the evidence of past research that showed the syllogism task
demonstrated the highest degree of transfer it was predicted that the syllogism task
would demonstrate the most learning in phase one. With the exception of the
syllvgism task none of the other tasks had previously been presented using no
repetition of items so there was no precedent for anticipating the amount of learning
that would occur in each tasks under these conditions. However, based on the amount
of transfer that had occurred with the tasks in previous research it was predicted that
the algebra task would show the second highest learning rate followed by the
alphabet-arithmetic task and the reverse reading task.

In the training and transfer phases {phases 2 & 3) participants encountered a different
task to the one in which they were involved in phase 1. These phases each comprised
10 items repeated ten times making 100 items in total, with different items in each
phase. This aspect ofthe study largely replicated previous experiments using these
tasks with the exception of the syllogism task. In the previous studies, the algebra,
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alphabet-arithmetic and reverse reading tasks were all presented to participants as a
small set of items repeated a number of times. In the original syllogisms task no
items were repeated during the training or transfer phases. In the present study in
onlcr to maintainunif'ormmcthodology across the tasks the syllogism task was
presented in an identical format to the other three tasks; namely 1()items repeated ten
times.

The design of this experiment allowed a direct comparison of the amount of transfer
that occurred across the different tasks. It also enabled examination of the
relationship to be made between the pattern of transfer and the pattern of learning
that occurred in phase one. The hypothesis under test in this experiment predicts that
the more learning that occurred in a particular task in phase one, the greater will be
the degree of transfer on that task between phases two and three. Based on the results
of previous research using these tasks, it was predicted that the syllogism task would
demonstrate general transfer, the algebra task would show general and specific
transfer and both the alphabet-arithmetic and reverse words tasks would result in
zero transfer.

44
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Method
Design

Participants were randomly assigned to one of lOur groups with each group
comprising 15 people. Each group received training in phase I on one of the four
tasks (i.e., syllogistic reasoning; alphabet -arithmetic; algebraic equation; mirror
reverse words).

Following phase I each group was further sub-divided into three, making 12 subgroups in total, each comprising 5 participants. Each sub-group experienced two
more phases (phases 2 & 3) where they performed a different task to the one
encountered in phase 1.

Participants

Volunteers were recruited from the Edith Cowan University School of Psychology's
research participant's register. A total of74 individuals were tested. However, 14
failed to meet the perfonnance criterion of80% accuracy in one or more of the
phases and were omitted from the analysis. The remaining 60 participants comprised
46 females aged 17 - 62 years (mean

age~

29.22 years) and 14 males aged 17 - 52

years (mean age= 28.14 years). Participants were randomly assigned to groups.

Prior to the commencement of testing each participant was given a written
explanation of the study which gave sufficient information pertaining to the study to
ensure informed consent without explaining the expected outcomes (See Appendix
A).
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Materials
Three Apple Macintosh GJ computers running Supcrlah soflwurc were used fOr
stimulus presentation and response recording.

Proccdttrc

General instructions and procedures were the same for all four tasks. Only the
instmctions pertaining to the solution of the individual problems differed. The basic
fom1at of the exercise was explained to each participant verbally. They were told that
a problem would appear on the screen that they were required to solve mentally.
When they knew the answer they were to press the spacebar, which would cause the
problem to disappear and bring a stimulus on to the screen. The participant then had
to decide whether the stimulus was 'TRUE' or 'FALSE' for that particular problem.
For a 'TRUE' response participants were to press the 'Z' button on the keyboard, and
for 'FALSE' they had to press the 'X' button. After the participant had made a
response, feedback was given in the form of a statement appearing on the screen
saying either 'CORRECT' or 'INCORRECT'.

Written instructions reminding the participants which buttons to press were provided
and left with the participant. In addition the 'Z' button on the computer keyboard was
covered with a green sticker marked 'TRUE' and the 'X' button was covered with a
red sticker marked 'FALSE' as a visual reminder of which keys to use. Participants
were told to work as quickly as they could without sacrificing accuracy.

Once the general procedure for all the tasks was explained, two practice items were
presented in order to illustrate the specific task undertaken in phase I. Following
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these practice ite111s a message appeared on the screen saying "Pn:ss spacebar to start
experiment" :.11 which stage the participant was given the option of continuing with
the experiment or repeating the practice items. Similar practice items were also
presented at the beginning ofphasc 2, hut not at the beginning ofrhasc 3 (Sec

Appendix B).

Each phase took approximately 20 minutes so that each participant spent one hour on
the computer. They were told that they could rest between phases but not to stop in
the middle of a phase. At the end of the session participants were debriefed and
thanked.

Syllogism Task. The syllogism task involved participants solving syllogisms
such as:
All artists are beekeepers
} premises
All beekeepers are chemh'ts

All artists are chemists

conclusion

A typical trial started with the presentation of the two premises. When the spacebar
was pressed the first two premises disappeared and a conclusion appeared. At this
stage the participant had to decide if the conclusion was correct based on the
infonnation contained in the premises. For instance, in the above example the
conclusion is correct and the appropriate response would be 'TRUEn. False
conclusions were also presented. In the above example, a conclusion that would have
required a "FALSE" response would be "All chemists arc artists".
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The Phase I version oft he syllogism task comprised 80 trials with no repetition of
items or content words. That is, no syllogism appeared more than once and none of
the key words (e.g., beekeepers, chemists, artists, etc.) were repeated. The Phase 2
version had 100 trials with 50 having a "TRUE" conclusion (e.g., All artists arc
chemists) and 50 having a "FALSE" conclusion (e.g., All chemists arc artists).

In phase 2 one set of syllogisms was presented that was repeated ten times. Of these
syllogisms five were presented as in the order presented earlier. This syllogism has
an ABBC order, which refers to the ordering of the elements within the premises
(i.e., A for artist, B for beekeeper, and C for chemist). The remaining five syllogisms
were presented in a BCAB order which is similar to the previous example but with
the premises presented in reverse order, for example:

All beekeepers are chemists
All artists are beekeepers
All artists are chemists

Note that the ABBC and the BCAB syllogisms have the same 'TRUE' conclusion.
The "FALSE" trials differed only in that the conclusion was the converse of the
TRUE' conclusion and hence incorrect (e.g., all chemists are artists). Phase 3
followed the same format as phase 2 except a completely different set of syllogisms
was used.

Alphabet- Arithmetic Task~In the alphabet-arithmetic task participants were
required to judge statements such as A + 3 == D as "TRUE" or "FALSE". The lt:ttcr
"A" was to be considered a starting point in the alphabet and the number "3" denoted
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the number of letters IOrward in the alphabet from this point that the solution (i .c.,
the letter D) was supposed to occur. In this example the appropriate response is
"TRUE". In the "F ALSE 11 trials the solution letter was either one letter more or one
letter less than the correct one. In respect to the previous example, false stimuli
would be A + 3 ~ C or A + 3 ~ E.

In the Phase 1 version of the alphabet-arithmetic task, participants experienced 80
trials with no repetition of number-letter association. Letters from the entire alphabet
and numbers 1 to 5 were used in the stimuli. For example if'A + 3' was presented it
would not have been repeated. Instead the letter 'A' would be paired with a different
number (e.g., A+ 5). In addition if the "TRUE" version of a number-letter pair was
presented, (e.g., A+ 3 ~D) the "FALSE" version (i.e., A+ 3 ~Cor E) was not, and
vtce-versa.

In a typical trial, participants were presented with a statement such as A + 3 = ? on
the screen. After the spacebar was pressed the equation disappeared and a solution
appeared on the screen. If the problem was A+ 3 =?,then a "TRUE" answer would
beD and a "FALSE" answer would be either C or E. The participant was required to
compare the presented answer with the solution they had generated and respond to
"TRUE" or "FALSE" by pressing the appropriate key on the keyboard.

The Phase 2 version of the task involved 100 trials with 50 being "TRUE" and 50
being "FALSE11 • The "TRUE" condition presented 10 letters (i.e., A-J) always paired
with the same number (2-5). So the letters A, E, and I were always paired with the
number 2; B F and J were paired with 3; C and G were paired with 4; and D and H
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were paired with 5. The "PALSE 11 trials had the same restrictions as the "TRUEu
trials but comprised 25 items where the presented value was one more than the
correct value (e.g .. B + 4 =G) and 25 items where the presented value was one: less
than the correct value (e.g., B + 4 =E). Thus the I 00 trials consisted of' the I0 letternumber pairs repeated I0 times. Phase 3 involved I00 trials under identical
conditions to phase 2 hut used a different set of letters (e.g.,K-T).

Algebra Task. The algebra task involved participants solving the equation
2

x - y = A with supplied values for the x andy parameters. For example with X= 5
2
andY= 9 the equation becomes (25- 9) + 2 = 9. On a typical trial, the equation was
presented in the centre of the screen with the values for x andy presented below the
equation. Participants were required to calculate a value for 'Nand to press the
spacebar when this was completed. When the spacebar was pressed the equation and
x- y values disappeared and a value for 'A' was presented. For the "TRUE" trials the
value for A was correct. In the example above A= 8. For the "FALSE" trials the
value for 'A' that was presented was either one more or one less than the correct
response (i.e., in the above example A= 9 or A= 7).

The Phase I version of the task comprised 58 trials, which involved repetition of
individual values for x andy but not x - y pairings. So a participant saw X = 5 and Y
= 9 in only one trial, but would see X= 5 andY= 7 in another trial. In the phase 2
version of the task there were 100 trials comprising 10 specific x- y pairings (See
Appendix B for specific x andy values). Each of these x-y pairs were repeated I 0
times in random order, in addition, if the "TRUE" version of a specific x- y pair was
presented the "FALSE" version of that x- y pair was not and vice versa. Of the I 00
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trials 50 required a "TRUE" response (5 in each hlock of I0 trials). That is, the
presented value for A was correct (e.g., A= 8). The remaining 50 trials were
"FALSE" trials (5 in each block of 10 trials). where the presented value for A was
either one more (25 trials) or one less (25 trials) than the correct value (e.g., A= 9 or
A= 7). The Phase 3 version of the task was similar to the phase 2 version but
different values for x andy were used.

1\firror Reversed Reading Task. In the mirror reversed reading task

participants were presented with words, which were in correct letter order but each
letter appeared in mirror reversed form (reversed through the vertical axis). On each
trial participants were required to read the word and be prepared to make a rhyming
judgement about the word. When they were ready to make this judgement the
participants pressed the spacebar on the keyboard causing the original word to be
replaced by another word in normal type font.

The Phase I version of the task was comprised of 80 trials with no repetition of
words. Trials consisted of four to seven letter words using all letters and both upper
and lower cases. In the phase 2 and phase 3 versions the alphabet was divided into
two groups, duplicating the division made by Masson (1986), who reported four
experiments, all of which used the san1e division of letters. The Phase 2 version was
comprised of I 00 trials with words constructed from the letters ABDGIJKNQS with
no repetition of words. The phase 3 version was similar but the letters
CEFHLMOPRTWYZ were used. All three task versions contained equal numbers of
both "TRUE" (i.e., word pairs did rhyme) and "FALSE" (i.e., word pairs did not
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rhyme) trials. Although there was no n:pctition or stimulus words in this task then.:
obviously needed to he repetition oflettcrs.
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Results
Median scores for each block often trials were calculated for each participant fbr all
tasks. In phase I of the experiment the focus was on the amount oflcarning that
occurred in the absence of repeated items. A measure of the amount of learning that
occutTcd in phase one was calculated in terms of a percentage rate (i.e., (block I
mean- block 8 mean)-:- block I mean x I00) for each task. An additional percentage
was calculated to detennine the amount of learning that occurred in each block by
dividing the overall learning rate by the number of blocks of trials in each task.
Descriptive statistics, along with the percentage learning rate by block and the
overall percentage leaming rate by task are presented in Table 1. A one-way analysis
of variance (ANOVA) was also conducted to compare learning rates between the
tasks.

In phases 2 and 3 of the experiment the emphasis was on whether any transfer
occurred and, if so, to what degree. To identify whether transfer occurred in a
particular task, at test was conducted to compare the mean RT for block 1 of phase 2
with the mean RT for block one of phase 3. Any differences between these mean
RT's for each task were converted to

pen:.~ntage

transfer values (i.e., (block 1 phase 2

-block I phase 3) +block phase 2 x 100). A comparison of the extent of transfer that
occurred in each task needed to take into account the different nature of the tasks.
Thus it was important to interpret the amount of transfer that occurred on a particular
task between phases 2 and 3 in tenns of the amount of learning that occurred on that
task in phase 2. In this way individual differences in degree of difficulty between the
tasks would be equated and a comparison of the amount transfer that occurred in
each task could be made. To achieve this a savings measure was used that calculated

SJ
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the amount of time saved in phase 3 due to the learning that occurred in phase 2. This
entailed identifying where in phase 3 participants regained the RT speed that they
had at the end of phase 2 (e.g., (total number ofhloeks in phase 3- phase 3 block at
which phase 2 trial RT achieved)+ total number of blocks in phase 3 x I 00). A
further t test was conducted to assess the amount of slowing in RT between the start
of phase 3 and the end of phase 2 (i.e., block 10 phase 2 and block I phase 3). An
ANOV A was also conducted using the percentage measures to compare transfer
between tasks.
Table I. Descriptive Statistics by Task. Percentage Learning by Block and Overall Learning Rate By
Task for Phase I Data.
Task
Syllogism

Block
I
2
3
4

5
6
7

8
%Learning (total
%Learning (block
Alphabet-Arithmetic

I
2
3
4

5
6
7
8

%Learning (total)
%Learning (block
Algebra

I
2

J
4

5
6
%Learning (total)
%Learning (block)
Reverse Reading

t
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
%Learning (total)
%Learning (block)

Mean (ms)
!0657
9441
8922
5447
3977
3645
4085
4169
61%
7.6%
5078
4302
4008
4068
3657
4035
3291
33 !9
35%
4.3%
11201
7446
9666
9164
8952
8571
24%
3.9%
2729
1875
1754
2375
1624
1782
1486
1432
48%
5.9%

SD (ms)
7747
8061
10710
3444
1958
2185
2235
2463

1365
1310
1200
1937
1334
2123
1447
1002

4117
3924
2763
3316
2856
3564

1804
848
66 7
3029
676
1015
612
74J
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Phase I
The focus of phase one of the study was to assess the amount of learning that
occurred in the absence of repeated items. The results inUicatcd that the greatest
amount orlcarning occurred in the syllogism task where participants exhibited an
overall learning rate of 61 11:, and a learning rate per block of7.6 1%. This was followed
by the reverse reading task with an overall learning rate of 48%, and a learning rate
per block of 5.9%. The alphabet~arithmctic task showed a learning rate of 35%
overall and 4.3% by block, with the algebra task demonstrating the least amount of
learning with an overall learning rate of24% and a per block rate of 3.9 1%. The
differences in learning rate per block, however,

w~re

not significant !:(56)= .176, 12 =

.912.

Because learning occurred when no items were repeated during this phase of th'3
experiment, the results suggest that pm1icipants were able to develop a strategy to
perform the tasks. Due to the lack of significant difference between the learning rates
of each task caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions from these results.
However, the results suggest a trend that implies the effectiveness of the strategies
developed by participants, varied between the tasks as illustrated by the different
learning rates. These results also call into question Logan's ( 1988) assertion that
learning can only occur when items are repeated.

Phase2 and 3
Transfer occurred in the syllogism and algebra tasks because perfonnance was faster
in block 1 phase 3 than in block l phase 2 (syllogism task: !(14) = 2.262, R = .040;
algebra task !(14) = 5.551, Jl = .000). The comparative measure of transfer indicated
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that in the syllogism task there was 48.4 1Yh oftransfl:r hctwccn tlw two phases and in
the algebra task there was JS%1 transfer. The alphabet- arithmetic task demonstrated
transfer hut it was only 8.2 1XJ and the t test was not signi licant t( 14)

==

I .l ()3, n -"'

.264. There was zero transfer in the reverse reading task!( 14) = -1.913, n = .076, tile
percentage of transfer was -15%,. The pattern of transfer in this phase of the study
from most to least was syllogism, algebra, alphabet-arithmetic and reverse reading.
This pattem was not predicted by the pattcm of learning from phase one but it was
predicted by previous research using these tasks. Mean RT for each block of trials in
phase 2 and 3 is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Mean training and tmnsfer reaction times by t:~sk

There was a significant effect for the slowing ofRT between the end of phase 2 and
the beginning of phase 3 in all four tasks. For the syllogism task!( I4) = -2.844, 11 =
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.013 .; alplmhct-arithmct ic task !(\4) ~ 3.214, 11 ~ .Oilf>; the algebra task !( 14) ~ 2.316.n = .036; :md the reverse reading task!( 14) = -5.6(J6, n

= .000.

In the case of'

the reverse reading task RT at the beginning of phase 3 was slower than the
beginning of phase 2 indicating that performance on this task was worse at the
beginning of phase 3 than at the beginning ofrhase 2.

In tenns of the savings measure to assess how quickly particirants were able to
regain their phase 2 RT the algebra task demonstrated the most rapid return to pretransfer RT. Participants achieved their pre-transfer RT by block 3 resulting in 70%
savings on this task. The algebra task was followed by the reverse reading task with
participants regaining phase 2 RT by block 4 of phase 3, thus resulting in 60%
savings. In the syllogism task participants regained their pre-transfer RT by block 6
which indicated 40% savings and in the alphabet-arithmetic task participants
regained their phase 2 RT speed by block 7 phase 3 resulting in 30% savings.
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Discussion

The results failed to support the hypothesis that the amount of learning that occurred
in phase I would predict the amount of transfer between phase 2 and 3, although this
could be the result of the design of the study rather than the hypothesis being
incorrect. The second hypothesis; that the type of transfer is directly related to the
task involved, was supported by the results of this study as indicated by the different
types of transfer observed in the different tasks.

As stated earlier, the results from phase one of this study failed to reach significance;
statistically there was no difference between the learning rates of the different tasks.
Therefore it would be incorrect to attach too great an importance to the trend of
learning in the tasks, and any discussion of this phase must be conducted in the
context of there being no significant difference between the tasks. Having said that
there are some interesting issues to arise from this phase of the experiment.

On face value, the phase one data suggested a trend ofleaming in the order ofsyllogism task, reverse reading task, alphabet-arithmetic task, and algebra task with
the syllogism task demonstrating the most learning and the algebra task the least.
This pattern was unexpected because, based on the evidence of past research, it was
expected that the reverse reading task would have shown the least amount of learning
and the algebra task would have been second highest after the syllogism task.

One possible explanation for this result is that in the original algebra experiment
Greig and Speelman (1998) used a small set ofx, y values, which were repeated
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several times in the training phase. In performing the task in thi~ way, participant:-;
were likely to have refined a strategy fOr pcrfbrrning the tusk hut also dcveloped
memories of the spcci lie x - y pairs. This suggests that perfOrmance in the original
experiment was a combination of relined strategy and efficient memory recall. In the
present study, participants were presented with 80 items with no repetition of specific
x, y pairs, so pcrfonnancc was based solely on the development and refinement of a
strategy.

The results of the present study indicate that it took participants some considerable
time to develop an effective strategy to perfonn the algebra task and this resulted in a
learning rate of only 24%. It also suggests that the absence of repeated items
encourages the development of an algorithm to perfonn a task, whereas the repetition
of items encourages the use of memory.

In tenns of the learning rate in the reverse reading task, this could also be accounted
for by the design of the study. Although there was no repetition of words in this
phase of the study, there are only 26 letters in the alphabet, consequently there has to
be repetition of letters. It is possible that over the course of the 80 items, participants
became adept at recognising the shape of the individual letters and so were able to
read the reversed word quite easily by the end of this phase.

Conceivably it could be argued that it was the design of the study that resulted in the
phase one learning rate failing to predict the transfer in phases two and three rather
than the hypothesis being incorrect. Ifthe study was replicated using tasks where
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there was no repetition at all, using a much larger sample size, it might be possible to
draw a definite conclusion regarding this issue.

The amount oflcarning that occurred in phase I, in the absence of repeated items
cannot he accounted for by Logan's theory in its present form. Because there was no
repetition of items no instances could be retrieved, which in tcnns of the instance
theory means there should be no learning. Logan stipulates that instances arc stored
individually every time a stimulus is encountered, and that those instances are highly
specific to the stimulus. However, if the instances were allowed to be more abstract
they might be applied to situations where similarities between stimuli exist, in this
way the theory could account for learning in the absence of repeated items (Rickard,
1997; Speelman & Kirsner, 1997).

It was this assumption that fom1ed the basis for Palmeri's (1997) EBRW theory of
learning, which states that the specific nature of transfer can be influenced by the
similarity of examples in memory. According to EBRW, memory exemplars are
retrieved in proportion to their similarity to the stimulus presented. In this way items
that are similar, but not identical, to the current stimulus could be of benefit in a new
version of an old task. This is similar to the propositional theory introduced by
Logan and Etherton (1994) that holds instances to be propositions that are capable of
expressing similarities between instances. lfthe instance theory were to be modified
in this way it would be able to account for the level of! earning that occurred in phase
one of the present study when no items were repeated.
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However, the improvement in performance witnessed in phase one of the exrerinwnt
can be accounted for by ACT*. It is evident that purticipants were a hie to develop a
strategy to perform the various tasks and the refinement and strengthening of the
productions used in the perfcnnance of the tasks led to the improvement in RT
(Anderson, 1983, 1987, 1993; Speelman & Kirsner, 1997). That some tasks
demonstrated more learning than others did implies that some tasks were better able
to generate a solution strategy than others.

The pattem of results pertaining to the amount of transfer that occurred in phases two
and three supports previous research using these tasks. Both the syllogism and
algebra tasks demonstrated partial positive transfer, albeit to different Ie.-els. The
alphabet-arithmetic task showed some transfer but not to a statistically significant
level and therefore is considered to be zero. The reverse reading task also showed
zero transfer but in this case RT at the start of phase 3 was slower than at the start of
phase 2, indicating that performance at the start of the transfer phase was worse than
at the start of the training phase.

Although the syllogism task demonstrated transfer it was not complete transfer as
demonstrated by Speelman and Kirsner (1997). Again this result could be an artefact
of the design of the present study. In the original Speelman and Kirsner experiment
there was no repetition of any syllogisms in either the training or transfer phases.
Whereas in the present study ten syllogisms, each repeated ten times, were presented
in the training and transfer phases. This suggests that the different levels of transfer
that occurred in the two studies can be accounted for by the different training and
transfer conditions.
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The Speelman and Kirsner results suggest that due to the lack of' n.:pctition,
participants developed an algorithm fOr solving the syllogisms and this was
transferred effectively from the training phase to the transfer phase of the study. In
contrast. the repetition of syllogisms in this study indicates that although participants
developed an algorithm in the !mining phase and transferred it to the transfer phase,
they <1lso relied on their memory of the correct conclusion to specific syllogisms.
Because new syllogisms were presented in the transfer phase tbose memories would
not have benefited the participant in the transfer phase. Therefore, general learning
from the training phase (i.e., the algorithm) was beneficial in the transfer phase, but
the specific learning (i.e., the correct conclusion to specific syllogisms) was not
beneficial in the transfer phase. Consequently, RT slowed significantly at the start of
phase three compared to the end of phase two, but was not as slow as at the
beginning of training.

This pattern of results was also found in the algebra task and supports the previous
research by Greig and Speelman (1998) who found transfer can be both general and
specific within the same task. It also supports the suggestion made previously that
the repetition of specific items encourages participants to use memory based retrieval
to perform the task, whereas lack of repetition forces them to develop and refine an
algorithm.

The lack of transfer observed in the alphabet-arithmetic task again supports previous
research using the task where transfer was found to be highly specific to items
experienced during training (Logan, 1988; Logan & Klapp, 1991; Klapp, Boches,
Trabert & Logan, 1991). The results obviously support the instance theory that no
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transfer would occur due to there being no stored instances of the new stimulus
items. However it can also be accounted fOr by the ACT*, in that although hoth
phase 2 and 3 involved the same task, the solution strategy utilised in phase 2 was
not generalisable to the items encountered in phase J.

In his original experiment, Logan (1988) remarked that participants reported their
strategy as~ saying the alphabet to themselves until the target letter was reached and
then incorporating the digit addend to arrive at an answer, participants in the present
study reported using this same strategy. Naturally if this strategy was applied to the
second phase of the study, which utilised letters from the latter half of the alphabet
RT is bound to be slower as it would take longer to reach the target letter.

This illustrates Carlson and Schneider's ( 1989) criticism of ACT* in that it can be
made to account for any level of transfer that occurs. Anderson ( 1983) counters this
argument by stating that rather than the theory being manipulated to account for
varying amounts of transfer, it is an example of participants adherence to an
inefficient strategy. During the training phase, participants were able to develop a
solution strategy to perfonn the task, and because it had proved effective, continued
to use the same strategy in the transfer phase. However, because the transfer phase
comprised letters from the latter half of the alphabet, the strategy took longer to
arrive at an answer and by definition resulted in slower reaction times. Therefore,
slower RT was a product of inefficient strategy selection rather than the lack of
shared components.
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It would be interesting to test this ussumption by modifYing the experiment slightly.
Instead of simply dividing the alphabet in half A - J :.md K - T as Logun did, the
division should he a combination ofhoth early and late letters similar to the division
made by Masson (1986) in the reverse words experiment. This would remove the
confound of the time taken to reach the target Jetter in phase 3 and allow a more
balanced comparison of the two phases to detennine if transfer is affected by the
confound.

The fourth task, reverse words showed zero transfer to the degree that RT was slower
at the start of phase 3 than it had been at the beginning of phase 2. This implies that
participants developed a solution strategy that applied only to the items experienced
in phase 2 of the study. When they were presented with new items in phase 3, that
strategy was not effective and consequently RT's were significantly slower than at
the start of phase 2 and indicates that learning from phase 2 could not be applied to
the new situation. Intuitively this result makes sense in that, learning to read the
letters CAT backwards would not share any elements with leaming to read the letters
PEN backwards; therefore it is not surprising that participants were unable to
develop a general learning strategy to solve the new problems.

The fact that participants were slower at the start of phase 3 than they were at tl1e
beginning of phase 2 raises the issue of what Anderson (1995) called negative
transfer. Anderson (1995) states that only one example of negative transfer has
previously been reported with regard to cognitive skills, that is the Einstellung effect
or mechanisation ofthought. This was illustrated by the Luchin's ( 1942) water jug
experiments, where it was shown that participants will persistently use a solution
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strategy that lms hcen demonstrated to work in the past, even when a simpler more
crticicnt alternative is available (Anderson, 191J5). Consequently, Anderson (I CJI)5)
argues negative transfer is a case of transferring information that is no longer useful
rather than failure to transfer. It is in effect an example of perfect transfer of
productions that lead to less than optimal perfonnancc and it is an argument that can
equally be applied to the results of the alphabet-arithmetic task as well as to the
reverse reading task.

Another explanation for negative or zero transfer offered by Anderson ( 1987) is

working-memmy failure. Based on experiments with students designing computer
programmes, Anderson and Jeffries (1985) found that 30% of errors made by
students were related to working-memory failure. When the demands of one part of
the programming procedure were increased, errors occurred in other parts,
suggesting that there were capacity limits to working-memory. Previous research
(Jeffries, Turner, Polson, & Atwood, 1981) also points to capacity overload as being
a major contributor to individual differences between programmers.

Anderson (1987) argues this is because loss of declarative infonnation from
working-memory can "cause good productions to behave badli' (p. 203). In simple
tenns, ifinfonnation is lost that is needed in an answer, the answer will not contain
that infonnation and so will be deficient. This position also receives support from
research comparing novice and expert perfonnance, which appears to indicate the
only difference between the two is the ability of the expert to remember larger
chunks of domain specific information (Chase & Erikson, 1982; Chase & Simon,
1973; Egan & Swartz, 1979; Reitman, 1976; Speelman & Maybery, 1998).
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In the cas~: of the present study it is hard to sec how any ofthcsc suggcstions can
account for the poorer performance in phase 3 of the reverse reading task. It cannot
he a case of loss of infonnation from working memory or the loss of dcclarative
infonnation because phase 3 involved completely new items, thereforc no prior
knowledge relating to these items existed to be 'lost from memory'. Rather it is more
likely that the slower reaction times in phase 3 were an artefact of the task in that it
simply took longer for participants to recognise the shapes of the reversed letters
involved in this phase of the experiment.

The savings analysis of phase three data was designed to assess the benefit derived
from the learning that occurred in phase two. This method of assessing learning
identifies unconscious as well as conscious learning, and as such is able to quantify
levels of learning even when the participant is unable to verbalise what has been
learned (Roediger, 1990). The results from phase three indicate that there was a
saving of 70% in the algebra task, followed by 60% for reverse reading, 40% for the
syllogism task and 30% in the alphabet-arithmetic task.

This appears to suggest that the measure of transfer does not necessarily represent the
entire benefit of past learning. The syllogism task showed the greatest amount of
transfer at 48.4% compared with 38% in the algebra task, and yet in tenns of the
savings measure the two tasks reverse their position with the algebra task
demonstrating the greater savings (70% compared with 40% in the syllogism task).
This implies that although RT's in the algebra task slowed at the beginning of the
transfer phase, participants had learned the equation strategy so well in the training
phase that this allowed a faster return to pre-transfer RT's than in the case of the
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syllogism task. In other words, participants in this study were better able to Jearn the
algorithm for solving the algebra equation than the ;_t/gorithm for solving the
syJic,dsms.

It is clear that the nature of' skill acquisition and transfer is directly related to the task

involved. If a task contains properties that arc useful when applied to a different task
it will result in general transfer. Conversely tasks that demonstrate specific transfer
do so because they are inherently specific, that is there arc no general features in the
task that can be incorporated in a general perfonnance strategy and so no such
strategy can be developed that could facilitate transfer to another domain. Each of the
four tasks described above differs in its capability to develop general skills; hence
different types of transfer resulted as a function of the task being performed.

The Logan (1988) and Masson (1986) experiments can be characterised as involving
tasks where highly specific stimuli were experienced repeatedly. It is reasonable to
assume that participants would develop strategies that relied heavily on memory, as
this would be more efficient than generating new solutions. In the Speelman and
Kirsner ( 1997) syllogism experiment, relying on memory would have been far more
difficult than developing a solution that could be transposed to all new syllogisms.
Likewise a reliance on memory in the algebra task as reported by Greig and
Speelman (1998) was only beneficial in tenns of remembering one's times tables.
Because the x- y pairings changed, memory for specific pairings would have been
redundant, therefore a more general strategy was needed to solve the problems.

The results ofthis study are consistent with the Anderson's ACT* theoty of skill
acquisition but they present difficulties for Logan's instance theory as it presently
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stands. The instance theory is unable to account lOr the level of' learning in phase one
of the study where all flntr tasks demonstrated learning to some degree. As stated
earlier the instance theory cannot explain how learning occurs in the ahscncc of
repeated items. It is also unable to account for the transfer that occurred in the
syllogism and algebra tasks when new items were presented in the transfer phase.
However. as other researchers have illustrated (Palmeri, 1997; Speelman & Kirsner,
1998) with slight modification the instance theory can be adjusied to align it with
empirical evidence.

GB
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Appendix A
Information Sheet

The experiment in which you arc about to participate is designed to
investigate some of the ways in which we acquire mental skills. It is
being conducted as part of an Honours Degree and is being supervised by
Dr. Craig Speelman, lecturer in Psychology. This experiment conforms to
the guidelines produced by Edith Cowan University Committee for the
Conduct of Ethical Research.
In this experiment you will be required to perform some simple problem
solving tasks. These will be presented on the computer screen and you
will have to respond by using the mouse to click a button on the screen.
You do not need to have done anything like this before and most of the
participants will never have been involved in an experiment of this kind.
The aim of the experiment is to examine the role of practice in mastering
a task. Your participation will last approximately one hour.
Please be assured that any information that you provide will be held in
the strictest of confidence by the researcher. At no time will your name be
reported along with your responses. All data will be reported in group
form only. The results of the study will be available at the conclusion of
the project, should you wish to have a copy sent to you tick the box at the
bottom of the page.
Please understand that your pm .. cipation in this research is totally
voluntary and you are free to withdraw at any time during the study
without penalty, and to remove any data that you may have contribmed.
Any questions concerning this project can be directed to Dr. Craig
Speelman (Supervisor) of the School of Psychology on 9400 5724.

Thankyou for your interest in this project

Dawn Darlaston- Jones
Please send me a copy of the results at the end ofthe project ro

Informed Consent
I (the participant) have read the information above and any
questions I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree
to participate in this activity, realising that I may withdraw at any
time. I agr·ee that research data gathered for the study may be
published, provided I am not identifiable.

Participant

Date

Investigator

Date

Appendix B- Stimulus Items

Stimulus hems for Syllog,ism Task
Phase I
\.I

1.2
1.3

1.4
1.5

1.6
1.7

1.8
1.9
\.\()

1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1. 18
1.19
1.20
2.21
2.22

All or the accountants arc blood donors.
All of the blood donors arc cynics.
All of the administrators arc celebrities.
All of the celebrities arc nephews.
All of the estate agents arc pilots.
All of the pilots arc joggers.
All of the ambassadors arc trumpeters.
All of the trumpeters are blondes.
All of the footballers are fathers.
All of the arbiters are footballers.
All of the country folk are clairvoyants.
All of the architects are country folk.
All of the travellers are gymnasts.
All of the attomeys are travellers.
All of the musicians are killers.
All of the auctioneers are musicians.
All of the auditors are readers.
All of the readers are tenors.
All of the bakers are lodgers.
All of the lodgers are competitors.
Ail of the ballerinas are collectors.
All of the collectors are fascists.
All of the bankers are performers.
All of the performers are guardians.
All of the jurors are drunks.
All of the barbers arc jurors.
All of the earls are sceptics.
All of the beach inspectors are earls.
All of the intellectuals are lovers.
All ofthe beggars are intellectuals.
All of the liars are martyrs.
All of the bellydancers are liars.
All ofthe boot makers are high jumpers.
All of the high jumpers are traitors.
All ofthe botanists are heirs.
All of the heirs are purists.
All of the builders are Christians.
All of the Christians are uncles.
All ofthe buskers arc graduates.
All ofthe graduates are perfectionists.
All of the puppeteers are moralists.
All of the butchers are puppeteers.
All of the husbands are skiers.
All ofthe butlers are husbands.

2.23
2.24
2.25
2.26
2.27
2.28
2.29
2.30
2.31
2.32
2.33
2.34
2.35
2.36
2.3 7
2.38
2.39
2.40
3.41
3.42
3.43
3.44
3.45
3.46
3.47

All of the hunters arc cricketers.
All of the carpenters arc hunters.
All of' the mothers arc singers.
All of the cashiers arc mothers.
All of the chairmen arc landowners.
All of the landowners arc cowards.
All of the chauffeurs arc anglers.
All of the anglers arc hedonists.
All of the clerks arc gentlemen.
All of the gentlemen arc murderers.
All of the clinicians are honeymooners.
All of the honeymooners are prisoners.
All of the nationalists arc cardplayers.
All of the cobblers arc nationalists.
All of the cooks are drinkers.
All of the colonels are cooks.
All of the multilinguists are drummers.
All of the commissioners are multi linguists.
All of the naturalists are dukes.
All of the comperes are naturalists.
All of the constables are archers.
All of the archers are marxists.
All of the consuls are hurdlers.
All of the hurdlers are extroverts.
All of the coroners are whistlers.
All of the whistlers are optimists.
All of the councillors are marksmen.
All of the marksmen are parents.
All of the bachelors are boxers.
All of the counterfeiters are bachelors.
All of the voters are gardeners.
All of the couriers arc voters.
All of the meditators are pragmatists.
All of the chemists are meditators.
All of the baritones are landlords.
All of the curators are baritones.
All of the beans are bilinguals.
All of the bilinguals are communists.
All ofthe decorators are golfers.
All of the golfers are bullies.
All of the detectives are actors.
All of the actors are sailors.
All of the diplomats are rowers.
All of the rowers are comedians.
All of the connoisseurs are alarmists.
All of the directors are connoisseurs.
All of the authors are puritans.
All of the doctors are authors.
All of the millionaires are budhists.
All of the dramatists are millionaires.

3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
3.52
3.53
3.54
3.55
3.56
3.57
3.58
3.59
3.60
4.61
4.62
4.63
4.64
4.65
4.66
4.67
4.68
4.69
4.70
4.71
4.72

All of the colonists arc alcoholics.
All of the dransmcn arc colonists.
All ofthc drovers arc aborigines.
All of the aborigines :trc electors.
All of the engineers arc debaters.
All of the debaters arc runners.
All of the historians arc entrepreneurs.
All of the entrepreneurs arc ussassins.
All of the evangelists arc householders.
All of the householders arc longjumpcrs.
All of the critics are riders.
All of the foremen arc critics.
All of the bouncers arc aristocrats.
All of the foresters are bouncers.
All of the novelists are acrobats.
All of the gangsters are novelists.
All of the students are behaviourists.
All of the garbage collectors arc students.
All of the grocers are housewives.
All of the housewives are pianists.
All of the security guards are capitalists.
All of the capitalists are enthusiasts.
All of the hostesses are knitters.
All of the knitters are impressionists.
All ofthe industrialists are knights.
All of the knights are orators.
All of the clowns are furriers.
All of the insurance agents are clowns.
All of the beekeepers are drug addicts.
All of the interviewers are beekeepers.
All of the in venters are burglars.
All of the janitors are in venters.
All of the caddies are satirists.
All of the jewellers are caddies.
All of the journalists are conjurers.
All of the conjurers are drives.
All of the lecturers are judges.
All of the judges are organists.
All ofthe gamekeepers are writers.
All of the writers are draftees.
All of the kitchenhands are pupils.
All of the pupils are sculptors.
All of the abductors are eccentrics.
All of the labourers are abductors.
All of the academics are gypsies.
All of the lawyers are academics.
All of the photographers are thieves.
All of the librarians are photographers.
All of the grammarians are soldiers.
All of the locksmiths are grammarians.

4.73
4.74
4.75
4.76
4.77
4.78
4.79
4.80

All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All
All

of the magistrates arc hostages.
of the hostages arc violinists.
of the mathematicians arc marines.
of the marines arc barons.
of the mechanics arc spectators.
of the spectators arc ventriloquists.
of the neurologists arc scholars.
of the scholars arc advisers.
ofthc criminals arc vigncrons.
of the conductors arc criminals.
ofthc nurses arc nutritionists.
ofthc nuns arc nurses.
ofthc physiologists arc statesmen.
of the officials are physiologists.
of the teachers arc vocalists.
of the opticians are teachers.

Phase I (Version 1) Conclusions
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
2.21
2.22
2.23
2.24
2.25
2.26
2.27
2.28
2.29
2.30

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

T
F

All of the accountants are cynics.
All of the nephews are administrators.
All of the estate agents are joggers.
All of the blondes are ambassadors.
All of the arbiters are fathers.
All of the clairvoyants are architects.
All of the attorneys are gymnasts.
All of the killers are auctioneers.
All of the auditors are tenors.
All of the competitors are bakers.
All of the ballerinas are fascists.
All of the guardians are bankers.
All of the barbers are drunks.
All of the sceptics are beach inspectors.
All ofthe beggars are lovers.
All of the martyrs are bellydancers.
All of the bootmakers are traitors.
All of the purists are botanists.
All of the builders are uncles.
All of the perfectionists are buckers.
All of the butchers are moralists.
All of the skiers are butlers.
All ofthe carpenters are cricketers.
All of the singers are cashiers.
All of the chairmen are cowards.
All of the hedonists are chauffeurs.
All of the clerks are murderers.
All of the prisoners are clinicians.
All of the cobblers are cardplayers.
All of the drinkers are colonels.

2.31
2.32
2.33
2.34
2.35
2.36
2.37
2.38
2.39
2.40
3.41
3.42
3.43
3.44
3.45
3.46
3.47
3.48
3.49
3.50
3.51
3.52
3.53
3.54
3.55
3.56
3.57
3.58
3.59
3.60
4.61
4.62
4.63
4.64
4.65
4.66
4.67
4.68
4.69
4.70
4.71
4.72
4.73
4.74
4.75
4.76
4.77
4.78
4.79
4.80

T

All of the commissioners urc drummers.

F

All of the dukes arc comperes.
All of the constables arc marxists.
All of the extroverts arc consuls.
All of tile coroners arc optimists.

T
F
T
F
T
F

T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F

T
F

T
F
T
F

T
F

T
F

All of the parents arc councillors.
All of the counterfeiters arc boxers.
All of the gardeners arc couriers.
All of the chemists arc pragmatists.
All of the landlords arc curators.
All of the deans arc communists.
All of the bullies are decorators.
All of the detectives are sailors.
All of the comedians are diplomats.
All of the directors are alarmists.
All of the puritans are doctors.
All of the dramatists are budhists.
All of the alcoholics are draftsmen.
All of the drovers are electors.
All of the runners are engineers.
All of the historians are assassins.
All of the longjumpers are evangelists.
All of the foremen are riders.
All ofthe aristocrats are foresters.
All of the gangsters are acrobats.
All of the behaviourists are garbage collectors.
All of the grocers are pianists.
All of the enthusiasts are security guards.
All of the hostesses are impressionists.
All of the orators are industrialists.
All of the insurance agents are furriers.
All of the drug addicts are interviewers.
All of the janitors are burglars.
All ofthe satirists are jewellers.
All of the journalists are drivers.
All of the organists are lecturers.
All ofthe gamekeepers are draftees.
All of the sculptors are kitchenhands.
All of the labourers are eccentrics.
All ofthe gypsies are lawyers.
All of the librarians are thieves.
All ofthe soldiers are locksmiths.
All ofthe magistrates are violinists.
All of the barons are mathematicians.
All of the mechanics are ventriloquists.
All of the advisers are neurologists.
All of the conductors are vignerons.
All of the nutritionists are nuns.
All of the officials are statesmen.
All of the vocalists are opticians.

Phase II (Syllogisms

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

A Version 2)

All of the parliamentarians arc pessimists
All of the pessimists arc artists.
All of the pawnbrokers arc painters.
All of the painters arc candidates.
All or the pharmacists arc senators.
All of the senators arc delinquents.
All of the physicians are researchers.
All of the researchers arc umpires.
All of the spies arc waiters.
All of the physicists are spies.
All of the pedestrians are hockeyplayers.
All of the plumbers are pedestrians.
All of the observers are customers.
All of the politicians are observers.
All of the prefects are poets.
All of the porters are prefects.
All of the priests are pensioners.
All of the pensioners are hennits.
All of the theoreticians are referees.
All of the psychologists are theoreticians.

Phase 2 Conclusions
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

T All of the parliamentarians are pessimists.
F Ali of the pessimists are parliamentarians.
TAll ofthe pawnbrokers are candidates.
FAll of the candidates are pawnbrokers.
TAll of the pharmacbts are senators.
FAll of the senators are pham1acists.
T All of the physicians are umpires.
FAll of the umpires are physicians.
TAll ofthe physicists are waiters.
FAll of the waiters are physicists.
TAll of the plumbers are hockeyplayers
FAll of the hockey players are plumbers.
TAll of the politicians are customers.
F All ofthe customers are politicians.
TAll ofthe porters are poets.
FAll ofthe poets are porters.
TAll of the priests are hermits.
F All ofthe hermits are priests.
TAll ofthe p'ychologists are referees.
FAll of the referees are psychologists.

Phase III

2

J
4

5
6
7
8
9
10

All of the principals arc craftsmen.
All of the crallsmcn arc philosophers.
All of the printers arc servants.
All of the servants arc henchmen.
All of the professors arc scientists.
All of the scientists arc apologists.
All of the statisticians arc marriage celebrants.
All of the recruits arc statisticians.
All of the tutors arc minstrels.
All of the programmers arc tutors.
All of the communicators are carvers.
All of the secretaries are communicators.
All of the tenors are accountants.
All of the high jumpers are tenors.
All of the competitors are administrators.
All of the heirs are competitors.
All of the puppeteers are drunks.
All of the drunks are arbiters.
All of the husbands are sceptics.
All of the sceptics are architects

Phase 3 Conclusions

TAll of the principals are philosophers
FAll of the philosophers are principals.
TAll of the printers are henchmen.
2.
F All of the henchmen are printers.
TAll of the professors are apologists.
3.
FAll of the apologists are professors.
4.
TAll of the recruits are marriage celebrants.
FAll of the marriage celebrants are recruits.
TAll of the programmers are minstrels.
5.
F All of the minstrels are programmers.
6.
T All of the secretaries arc carvers.
FAll of the carvers are secretaries.
7.
TAll of the highjumpcrs are accountants.
FAll of the accountmtts are highjumpers.
TAll of the heirs arr..: administrators.
8.
FAll of the administrators are heirs.
TAll of the puppeteers are arbiters.
9.
FAll of the arbiters are puppeteers.
10.
TAll of the husbands are architects.
FAll of the architects are husbands.
1.

Stimulus Items for

Alphabct~Arithmctic

task

Assumptions:
Phase I w uses all letters awl & numhcrs 2~5
so trials 20 no repetition or letters
60 repetition but item is different

Phase 2 - I 00 trials
50 true- I0 letters presented (A-J) always paid with the same
number.
50 false- as above except 25 true+ I & 25 true- 1

Phase 3- as phase 2 but with letters K-T

Phase I

I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

A+2~C

B +3

~

F

C+4~0
D+S~H

E

+2~0

F+3~.1

0+4~K

H +5

~L

!+2~

K

J+ 3 ~N

ll.K+4~0
12.L+5~P

13.M+2~0
14.N+3~R
15.0+4~S
16.P+5~T

17. Q + 2 ~ s
18. R + 3 ~ V
19.S+4~W

20. T+s~x
21. A+ 3 ~ D
22. B +4~ 0
23. C + 5 ~ H
24.D +2 ~ E
25. E + 3 ~ H
26.F+4~K

27. 0+5

~

L

28.H+2~I

29. I+ 3 ~ L
30.J+4~0
3l.K+5~P

TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE-I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE-I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -1
TRUE
FALSE +1
TRUE
FALSE-I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE+!
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +1
TRUE

32. L + 2 ~ M
JJ. M + 3 ° I'
34. N + 4 ~ R
35.0 + 5 = T
36. p + 2 ~ Q
0

37.Q+3~T

38. R + 4 ~ W
39. S + 5 ~X

40. T + 2 ~ U
4l.A+4~E

42. B + 5 ~ H
43. C + 2 ~ E
44. D + 3 ~ F
45.E+4=1
46. F + 5 = L
47.G+2=1
48. H + 3 =.I
49. 1+4=M

so . .I+ 5 = p
5l.K+2=M
52. L+3 =N
53. M+4=Q
54. N + 5 = T
55.0 + 2 = Q

56. P+ 3 =R
57.Q+4=U
58. R + 5 =X
59. + 2 =
60. T+J=V

s

u

6l.A+5=F
62. B

+2 = E

63.C+3=F
64. D+4=G
65.E+5=J
66. F

+ 2 =I

67.G+3=J
68. H +4=K
69. I+S=N
70. J+2 =M

7l.K+3=N

72. L+4=0
73.M+5=R
74. N+2=Q

75.0+3=R
76. P +4=S
77.Q+5=V
78. R + 2 =U
79.S+3=V
80. T+4=W

FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -1
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE-I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE-I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE-I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE-I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +1
TRUE
FALSE-I

Phase 2
I. A+2~C
2. A +2 ~ D
3. B+3~E
4. B+3~D
5. C'+4~G
6. C'+4~H
7. D+ 5 ~I
8. D +5 ~ H
9. E+2~G
IO.E+2~H

li.F+3~1
12.F+3~H

13.G+4~K
14.G+4~L

15.H+5~M
16.H+5~L

17.1 + 2 ~ K
18.!+2~L

19.J+3~M

20. J + 3 ~ L

TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE-I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE-!
TRUE
FALSE+!
TRUE
FALSE -1

REPEAT EACH ITEM 5 TIMES ~ I 00 TRIALS
PRESENT IN RANDOM ORDER

Phase 3
K+2~ M
K
+2~ N
2.
3. L +3 ~o
4. L+3~N
5. M+4~Q

\.

G. M+4~R
7. N+5 ~ S
8. N+5=R
9. 0+2~Q
10.0+2~R
ll.P+3~S

12. P + 3 ~ R
13.Q+4~U
14.Q+4~V
15.R+5~W

J6.R+5~v
17.S+2~U

!8.S+2~V

19. T+3~W
20. T + 3 ~ V

TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE+!
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE+!
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE -I
TRUE
FALSE +I
TRUE
FALSE-I

REPEAT EACH ITEM 5 TIMES ~ I 00 TRIALS
PRESENT IN RANDOM ORDER

Stimulus Items for Algebra Task
Phase I
Item

y

I

X
3

2

4

5
2

3

5

9

4

6

10

5

7
8
9
10

I

6

7
8

9
10
II

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
127
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

II

12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II

12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

4
3
8
7
6
I

6
5
6
9
10
7
4
9
10
3
4
7
8
II

12
5
6

11

II

12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

8
7
8

-

Presented

2
6
9
13
24
29
40
46
57
68
4
4
II

15
20
26
37
49
55
67
4
6
9
13
20
26
38
46
55
69
2
4

I

II

2
3
2
9
10

17
23
30
37
45
60
65
4
12
6
71

11

I

12
4
6
5
12

12
10
12
11

2

Response
T
F
F

T
T
F
F
T
T
F
T
F
F
T
T
F
T
F
F
T
F
T
T
F
F
T
T
F
T
F
F
T
F
T
T
F
F
T
T
F
F
T
F
T

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

,.,.-------5
15

7
8
9
10

II

12
3
12
4
3
4
7
6

4
12
5
6
7
8

9
10
II

F

F
F

T
T

16
22
29
39
50
58

I

T

T
T

II

2
5

-·-~--··--~

r

39
34
44
59
3
69

8

II

--

F

T
F

F
T

Phase 2
Item

X

y

Presented

I

5
5
5
5
8
8
8
8
9
9

9
13
15
2
4
6
8
17
19

8
6
8
5
30
30
29
29
32
30

2
3
4
5
6
7

8

9
10

II

Response
T
F
F
T
F
T
T
F
T
F

Repeat each item I0 times
Phase 3
Item

X

y

Presented

I

6
6
6

10
12
14
16

13
13
10
10
25
23
22
20
41
41

2
3

4
5
6
7

8
9

10

6
7
7
7
7

10
!0

Repeat each item I 0 times

I

3
5
7

!8
20

Correct
Response
T
F
F
T
F
T
T
F
T
F

Stimulus Items f'or reverse Reading Task
phase I
80 words using all letters
first 10 with no leiters repeated

I. sk *
2. FLY
3. ANT*
4. ba
5. RUM*
6. run
7. dome*
8. lick
9. HIKE*
10. PROD
11. ARRAY*
12. FLEW
l3.FOAM*
14. GAIT
15. GEAR*
16. HERALD
17. HOUSE*
18. HURRY
19. ISSUE*
20. ITEM
21. JACKET*
22.JAPAN
23. JUDGE*
24.KEEN
25. KERN*
26.KNEE
27. KNIGHT*
28. LADDER
29. LAGOON*
30. LAID
31. LAMP*
32. LATIN
33.LAUNCH*
34. LEAGUE
35. LEND*
36. MAKER*
37.MARBLE
38. MARINE*
39. MASS
40. MILK*
41. MINOR
42.MONEY*

HIGH
BUZZ
PANT
HAND
COME
HIDE
COMB
CALL
BIKE
SHOE
AWAY
CAGE
DOME
FOIL
SHEER
HOLDER
MOUSE
HEAVY
TISSUE
IMMUNE
PACKET
BASIN
BUDGE
MOON
TURN
KNIFE
BLIGHT
KILLER
SOON
KIND
STAMP
DANCER
PAUNCH
SIEVE
FRIEND
BAKER
STONE
SCENE
MORE
SILK
SMALL
I-lONEY

43. NAMELY
44. NATION*
45. NATURE
46. NUMBER*
47. NUMERAL
48. NURSE*
49. OFFICE
50. ORDER*
51. ORGAN
52. PAINT*
53. PLACE
54. PALM*
55. PAPER
56. PARK*
57. PENCIL
58. PICKET*
59. PICNIC
60. PISTOL*
61. POTATO
62. QUAfNT*
63. QUEEN
64. QUILL*
65. QUOTE
66. RACE*
67.RADAR
68. RAISE*
69.RANCH
70.REMARK*
71. RESCUE
72. SCALE*
73. SHARK
74. TANGLE*
75. TEAR
76. TENNIS*
77. VACANT
78. WANDER*
79. WEIGHT
80. YOGA*

HAPPY
STATION
INSIDE
SLUMBER
NEVER
PURSE
CHAIR
HOARDER
PLAYER
TAINT
PUT
BALM
SUGAR
STARK
PEOPLE
TICKET
PHRASE
BRISTOL
POWDER
PAINT
KING
SPILL
SPEEK
FACE
SAUCER
PRAISE
FARM
PARK
RETAIN
SALE
SHAPE
DANGLE
SHOUT
MENACE
VECTOR
PONDER
WATCH
TOGA

GROUP ILETTERS: ABDGI.IKNQSUVX

-

Phase 2

WORDS MARKED WITH A* ARE THE RHYMING WORDS
WORD

IUIYME

I. KINK*
2. AGAIN
3. AID*
4. AIR
5. AKIN
6. AND*
7. ANNA
8. ASIAN
9. ASK*
10. ASSIGN
I I. AVID*
12. AXIS*
13. BAD
!4. BAN*
!5. BANANA
16. BAND*
17. BANG
18. BANK*
19. BASIS
20. BASK*
21. BASS
22. BAUD*
23. BIAS
24. BIB*
25. BID
26. BIN*
27. BIND
28. BUD*
29.BUDDING
30. BUG*
31. BUGGING
32.BUN*
33.BUNK
34. DAD*
35. DAIS
;]6. DANK*
37. DJBS
38. DIG*
39.DAUB
40. DIN*
41. DING

LINK
ADULT
MADE
JAR
POLL
SAND
ACID
PITY
FLASK
MERRY
RABID
PRAXIS
BLAND
FAN
FILE
PLANNED
PORT
TANK
MAGIC
ASK
RARE
FRAUD
LOOSE
RIB
PINE
SIN
VlOU'
DUD
MAKING
MUG
TAKING
SUN
CALM
MAD
SAGE
THANK
RAID
FIG
DRAG
SIN
DRINK

42. DISDAIN*
43. DISK
44. DIVA*
45. DUN
4(,. DUNK*
47. DUSK
48. GAG*
49. GAUD
50. GAIN*
51. GANG
52. GIN*
53. GUN
54. GUNK*
55. INK
56. INNJNGS*
57. ISIS
58. JAB*
59. JAVA
60. JIG*
61. JUG
62. JUNK*
63.KAVA
64. KID*
65. KING
66.KISS*
67. NIB
68.NUN*
69.QUAD
70. SAGA*
71. SAID*
72. SAND
73. SANK*
74. SANS
75. SAVING*
76. SIGN
77. SING*
78. SINK*
79. SIX*
80. SKID
81. SKIN*
82. SNUG
83. SQUAD*
84. SUDS
85. SUNG*
86.SUNK
87. SUVA*
88. VAIN*
89. VAN
90. VISA*
91. VIVA

REFRAIN
DIVE
LEVER
PINK
SKUNK
DREAM
BAG
GREEN
REMAIN
GAVE
WIN
DUSK
JUNK
EAR
WINNINGS
RELY
GRAB
JADE
RIG
JUMP
SUNK
CAVE
BID
HEAD
MISS
NOSE
SUN
YEAR
TARGA
DREAD
POUND
BANK
HAIR
PAVING
SALE
BRING
DRINK
TRICKS
SCRAPE
TIN
SAME
PROD
BARN
TONGUE
RUSH
HOOVER
RAIN
BET
P!SA
VIOLA

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

VIVIAN*
VIVID*
SANG*
SNAG*
IBIS
JINX*
98. SNAG
99. BUNG*
IOO. GAS*
GROUP 2- LETTERS:
CEFHLMOPRTWYZ
I. CELL*

2.
3.
4.
5.
G.

CHEER
CHEF*
CHEW
CHOP*
CHOW
L CLOT*
8. COFFEE
9. COLE*
!0. COLT
II. COME*
!2. COOLER
!3. COPPER*
!4. COPY
15. CORE*
!6. CLEF
17. CREPT*
!8. CREW
!9. CROP*
20. CROW
21. ECHO
22. ELECT*
23. EMPLOY
24. ERECT*
25. ERROR
26. FEET*
27.FELLOW
28. FELT*
29. FERRY
30. FLEET*
31. FOWL
32. FOOL*
33. FOOT
34. FORE*
35.FORMER
36. FORTY*
37. FREE
38. FROZEN

BOLIVIAN
LIVID
BANG
DRAG
OPEN
LYNX
CRY
LUNG
LASS
phase 3

SPELL
CLIFF
DEAF
CHEAP
SHOP
SAIL
BLOT
BELLY
STOLE
COLD
SOME
FOLDER
SHOPPER
COPE
STORE
PAPER
SLEPT
CROW
STOP
CLAW
EDGE
SELECT
EMPIRE
CORRECT
ACORN
FLEET
BARROW
MELT
BELOW
SLEET
FORK
SPOOL
FEAR
DOOR
FERRY
NAUGHTY
FROG
BOOK

HEEL*
40. HELL*
41. HELM
42. HELP*
43. HERE
44. HERO*
45. HOLE
46. HOLY*
47. HOMELY
48. HOOP
49. HOTEL*
50. HOPE
51. HOWL*
52. LETTER
53. LOOM*
54. LOOP
55. LORE*
56. MEET
57. MELT*
58. MEMORY
59.MERCY*
60.MOLE
61. MOTHER*
62. LEFT
63. PEOPLE
64. POLE*
65. POLL
66. POLO*
67. POMP
68. POOL*
69. POORLY
70. PORCH*
71. PORTER
72. PREFER*
73.PRETTY
74.PYRE*
75. RECTOR
76. REFORM*
77. RELY
78. REMOTE*
79. REPEL
SO. RHYTHM
81. ROOM*
82. ROOT
*
83. ROPE*
84. TEETH
85. TEMPLE
86. THEFT*
87. THEME*
88. THEORY*
3~.

SEAL
SPELL
HOLD
YELP
SCAR
ZERO
PEARL
SOLEY
ARRAY
GATE
MOTEL
LODGE
SCOWL
LUNCH
DOOM
MODE
SAW
SAID
FELT
AGENCY
PERCY
ARCH
BROTHER
MILK
PERSON
SOLE
POND
SOLO
PUSH
STOOL
QUICKLY
TORCH
DECAY
REFER
TODDY
FIRE
SANDY
PERFORM
TEDDY
PROMOTE
CANDLE
SHOE
TOMB
BOOT
POPE
BOX
TOWER
LEFT
TEAM
TEARY

89. TORE
90. TORY*
91. TOTE
92. TROOP*
93. TROPHY
94. TYPE*
95. WELL
96. WEPT*
97. WERE
98. WHEEL*
99. WOLF
I 00. YELLOW*

SHOW
STORY
CALF

STOOP
.JOURNEY
WIPE
CAR

CREPT
SEEN
REAL
FOX
MELLOW

